

**Not Your Grandfather's Eastern Bloc  
The EU New Member States as Agenda  
Setters in the Enlarged European Union**

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The report is based mainly on in-depth country reports from the ten New Member States, but the responsibility for the analysis, the expressed views and conclusions lies with the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Open Society Institute – Sofia.

The publication is a product of the Open Society Institute – Sofia within the European Policies Initiative (EuPI) and the project “The EU New Member States as Agenda Setters in the Enlarged European Union”. This EuPI project has been implemented in close partnership with EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, with funding provided by the Open Society Institute – Sofia.

**About EuPI**

The European Policy Initiative (EuPI) aims at stimulating and assisting the New Member States from CEE to develop capacity for constructive co-authorship of common European policies at both government and civil society level. As a new priority area of the European Policies and Civic Participation Program of Open Society Institute – Sofia, EuPI will contribute to improving the capacity of New Member States to effectively impact common European policies through quality research, policy recommendations, networking and advocacy.

**Address:**

Open Society Institute – Sofia  
European Policies Initiative (EuPI)  
56 Solunska Str.  
Sofia 1000  
Tel.: (+359 2) 930 66 19  
Fax: (+359 2) 951 63 48  
E-mail: [eupi@osi.bg](mailto:eupi@osi.bg)  
Web EuPI: [www.eupi.eu](http://www.eupi.eu)  
Web OSI-Sofia: [www.osi.bg](http://www.osi.bg)

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The objective has been to map the positions and level of activity of the ten new EU Member States on a number of issues on the EU agenda; identifying the factors and drives behind these positions; looking at the level of political and public consensus and the influence of major stakeholders; outlining coalition patterns within the EU and, finally, trying to provide an outlook on possible change of these positions.

The countries have been classified on each of the policy issues as “Policy Takers”, “Policy Killers” or “Policy Drivers”, depending on their particular position and level of activity. In the classification of this study, Policy Takers are those states that usually follow the mainstream in the EU and in general accept whatever is offered from the EU. The Policy Driver is a country that assertively promotes an issue at EU level. A Policy Killer is a country that actively opposes the policy in question.

The research has been carried out by individual researchers in each of the ten new members on the basis of specially designed methodology, developed by EUROPEUM and major input from EuPI/OSI-Sofia. The seven policy areas under research are: I. Internal market/Lisbon Strategy; II. Minority integration and citizenship issues; III. Energy and climate change; IV. Budget review and CAP Health Check; V. EU foreign policy and enlargement; VI. Freedom, Security and Justice; VII. Institutional issues.

The research was carried out primarily in the period September 2008 – December 2009, but there may be references beyond this period. Some positions and circumstances described in the reports may have changed since the information was last made available to the researchers or reached the stage of publication.

The researchers’ findings are published in ten country reports on each of the New Member States: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The structure of the country reports includes an overview of the country’s performance as an EU member and seven chapters following the seven broad policy areas. Each chapter contains an overview of the position of this country in the area, including the top three national priorities. Then the chapters provide in-depth analyses, information and prognoses on a set of issues (defined as general and specific) within each of the seven policy areas.

A comparative report, based on the ten country reports, was produced to highlight the project’s findings.

The views expressed in the reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Open Society Institute – Sofia.

## Authors of the country reports

Bulgaria:	Marin Lessenski, EuPI, Open Society Institute – Sofia
Czech Republic:	Věra Řiháčková, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
Estonia:	Viljar Veebel, University of Tartu
Hungary:	Zoltan Pogatsa, West Hungarian University
Latvia:	Dace Akule, Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS
Lithuania:	Tomas Janeliūnas, Vilnius University, Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Center of Eastern Geopolitical Studies Živilė Dambrauskaitė, Center of Eastern Geopolitical Studies
Poland:	Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Romania:	Cristian Ghinea, Romanian Centre for European Policies (CRPE)

Slovakia: Vladimír Bartovic, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy

Slovenia: Urban Boljka, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy

**Author of the comparative report**

Marin Lessenski, EuPI, Open Society Institute – Sofia

**External reviewer of the comparative report**

Ivan Krastev, Center for Liberal Strategies

**Project team**

Assya Kavrakova, EuPI, Open Society Institute – Sofia

David Král, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy

Marin Lessenski, EuPI, Open Society Institute – Sofia

**Copy editor**

Samantha Chaitkin

**Comparative Policy Report**

**April 2009**

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**Marin Lessenski**

**EuPI – European Policies Initiative  
Open Society Institute – Sofia**

**EuPI – European Policies Initiative  
Open Society Institute – Sofia  
[www.eupi.eu](http://www.eupi.eu)**



## Contents

<b>8</b>	<b>Call me European. The new member states' quest for setting the EU agenda</b>
<b>13</b>	<b>A G10? The New Member States on internal market policies</b>
<b>15</b>	<b>Minorities: a minor issue on the EU agenda?</b>
<b>19</b>	<b>The new members and CAP: just another new vs. old rift</b>
<b>21</b>	<b>"Drill, baby, drill": the New Member States on the energy and climate package of the EU</b>
<b>29</b>	<b>A region with a mission: the enlargement, neighbourhood and defence policies</b>
<b>38</b>	<b>On the other side of the fence: policies in the area of freedom, security and justice</b>
<b>42</b>	<b>Visions of Europe: deciding on the institutional issues</b>
<b>47</b>	<b>Reality check</b>
<b>49</b>	<b>Wrapping up and looking ahead: three scenarios for the future</b>
<b>54</b>	<b>About the author</b>
<b>55</b>	<b>Supplements</b>
<b>60</b>	<b>Tables of national positions</b>

## Call me European.

### The new member states' quest for setting the EU agenda

This report, based on ten in-depth country studies, looks at the positions of the new Central and Eastern European EU Member States on a selected number of issues on the EU agenda in seven policy areas: economic issues, minority integration, energy and climate, common agriculture policy, foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs and institutional issues.

The focus is both on the level of activity and involvement in decision making as well as on the substance of these policies and the particular contribution they are making. The analyses also identify those focal points of interest and activity of the New Member States that punctuate the otherwise flat line of policy behaviour.

The report attempts to chart a dynamic map of the enlarged European Union from the viewpoint of the New Member States, weighting the positions and actions, relationships and coalition patterns, the interplay of diverse motives in decision shaping, and ultimately outlining short and medium term policy trends.

### The EU according to the New Member States: an alternative reality

Woody Allen once wondered what it would be like "If the Impressionists Had Been Dentists". Now, extend this "what if?" approach to the EU, put the New Member States fully in charge and project what Europe would be like if their collective policy wish list came true. The shortlist of their preferences would include three policy packages:

- **The foreign policy package:** a fast enlargement to the Western Balkans; a robust Eastern Neighbourhood Policy with a clear European membership perspective; and a one-voice Europe with a greater role in the world.
- **The energy and climate package:** energy security achieved by multiplied energy production from more nuclear power plants and more diverse imports of resources; renewed commitments to expanded global climate rules, but a laxer regime in Europe.
- **The economy package:** more liberal economic policies; freer movement of workers and services across borders; furthering the internal market; liberal taxation arrangements within the EU; fast expansion of the Euro area.

Still very important, just slightly down the list is:

- **The institutional package:** with fast track adoption of the Lisbon Treaty; modest competencies for the new president, a slightly better deal for the new "foreign minister"; a one-speed Europe for all and all possible checks to prevent the small states being elbowed out by the big ones.

### The wish list extended and explained

**A bigger and more dynamic EU:** If the new members were to decide on their own on enlargement, Croatia and Serbia would be accepted in a matter of months. DG Enlargement would be busy processing the negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. Georgia would have enhanced relations with the EU, within a very dynamic Neighbourhood Policy.

**Revamping the neighbourhood:** The Neighbourhood Policy would function as a preparatory school for starting accession negotiations with the Eastern neighbours. In general, the Eastern dimension would receive much more attention within the Neighbourhood Policy.

**NATO first:** The new members would rather retain a "NATO first" approach to the European Defence and Security Policy. The ESDP would receive very positive treatment but no big investments.

**A more competitive EU within a greener world:** It would be a nicer and cleaner world in general, as the big polluters such as India, China and the US would have embraced a new Kyoto Treaty. But Europe's own restrictions would be more lax. This

would lure industries to stay and invest more in Europe rather than running away to other countries. With the “carbon leakage” sealed, there would be many more jobs created in Europe. In addition to that, the combined effect of more and cheaper energy to be produced and more industries in place would bring back Europe’s crown as the world’s undisputed economic power house.

**Energy for growth:** Most of the cheap energy would be coming from a dozen more new reactors and entirely new nuclear power plants built in the region. Nuclear energy would have redeemed its place in the EU and would be seen as all but a green technology, environmentally friendly thanks to its lower greenhouse emissions. This would also be an incredible boost to the energy independence of the New Member States and by extension of the EU as a whole.

**More energy coming in:** Several New Member States (mostly in the northeast corner) would have their energy security guaranteed, above all eliminating their and EU’s as a whole dependence on imports from Russia. On the other side of the line, several new members would have multiplied their imports and dependence on Russia. In both cases, this would be achieved by more pipelines coming into the EU — the difference would be the starting point.

**The EU economy:** The New Member States would introduce more of the liberal

Votes in the Council	Country	MEPs (Nice, 2009)
10	Bulgaria	17
12	Czech Republic	22
4	Estonia	6
12	Hungary	22
4	Latvia	8
7	Lithuania	12
27	Poland	50
14	Romania	33
7	Slovakia	13
4	Slovenia	7
101	NMS total	190
345	EU total	736

economic thinking (even in the global crisis context), sweeping aside unnecessary regulation. The Euro area’s rules will be revised to allow fast entry of the new members.

**Tax sovereignty:** There would be no harmonisation of taxation in the EU. This will enhance the competition within the EU, and lower taxes will help the new members achieve their goals of catching up with the rest of the EU. The taxation issue would remain out of reach of QMV, so that it cannot be imposed if one state vetoes it.

**Free movement of workers:** Any barriers to free movement would be lifted and the EU would achieve a higher degree of worker mobility. This action is part of the four freedoms of the EU (freedom of movement of goods, persons, services and capital) and would help boost the productivity of the Union. They would not bother

about “employment policy dumping” vis-à-vis the old Member States.

**Free movement for services:** The New Member States would further liberalise the free movement of services. They consider this will bring them a competitive edge as they have advantages in this area over companies from the old Member States.

**Improving injustices in agriculture policy:** The new members would not revamp the CAP, but just tinker with it to prevent inequalities in aid between new and old Member States, as the new are getting some 5% of direct aid and the old the remaining 95%. They would also increase money for the second pillar of CAP, rural development, but without ruining the balance.

**EU budget:** Most new members, in a somewhat ungracious act, would scrap any rebates, hurting their formerly closest advocate for accession — the UK. They would not like to see any special “EU tax” as a way to replenish the common budget.

**The Lisbon Treaty:** A new Treaty will be voted ASAP, no questions asked, to prevent last-minute revisions by the big power players. But one would still have to mind the Czechs.

**The EU power balance balanced:** the new and mostly small members would seek to introduce enough checks and balances to prevent big states’ domination, including limited competencies for the new president, a high representative closer to the Commission, and retaining unanimous voting on key issues such as taxation.

**A humble president:** The new president of the EU may finally appear onstage, but the position would be reduced to ceremonial duties. One of the major reasons would be to

prevent the president from diminishing the role of the rotating presidencies held by the Member States.

### **Zones of incompatibility**

While the list above says a lot about the zone of agreement between the New Member States there is an alternative list that outlines the issues of disagreement:

**The CAP scrapped:** Estonia, with Lithuania joining in the longer term, is at odds with everyone else and would consider totally revising the CAP, scrapping direct aid altogether and earmarking the funds for forward-looking investments and technologies, rather than sticking with old-timer farming.

**Energy security through independence vs. energy security through interdependence:** All the New Member States are trying to achieve energy security, but the ways to achieve this divides them into two groups. One group of new members is implementing measures for boosting energy production and diversifying supply routes in order to escape dependence on Russia as the main and often the only supplier. A smaller group of states pursues energy security through increasing the interdependence with Russia, with more supplies from it, as the thinking goes that the Russian Federation needs EU markets and money in the same way the European states need its energy resources.

### **The jetlag syndrome**

While the lists above are drawn on the basis of new members' policy preferences, positions and actions, more often than not they are still passive in the EU decision-making process. Only part of the answer lies in the often tedious decision making and bargaining in the EU with the frequent outcome of a watered-down compromise solution.

The new members are definitely experiencing a "jetlag syndrome" after entering the EU, characterised by capacity deficiency to formulate positions or promote them effectively. They might find it difficult to switch from the pre-accession mentality, where they were subjected to an asymmetric negotiations process, to the new mindset of members.

This is a period of accommodation to the ways, coalitions and bargains in the EU. Lack of experience and expertise combines with a preoccupation with domestic problems at the expense of the EU agenda and the fact that the complex EU issues are tackled on expert level in some institution rather than through debate. Even the small representation of their citizens in the common institutions matters. And of course, the new members are also mainly small to medium-sized, resulting in fewer voting rights and less weight on the EU scene.

Their usual response is to go with the "EU consensus", assuming there is one, or alternatively the solutions are imposed on them.

The other problem identified is the lack of genuine critical thinking and debate in these states. This may be partially due to the inherited reflexes from the pre-accession period of negotiation, as the EU policies are considered "instant models" — sort-of copy the policy or the law, add water, stir and use.

But the jetlag explanation implies that this is a transitory effect, which will ultimately fade away. The more experience the countries accumulate, the more they join the inner circle of policies such as Schengen and the Euro zone, and with the expiration of the transition periods (such as the free movement of workers; or the monitoring of Bulgaria and Romania in JHA), the more assertive and involved these countries will be. This can be observed with the difference between the 2004 and 2007 entrants of the fifth enlargement, as longer membership brings experience, and holding the rotating presidency — as in Slovenia and the Czech Republic's case — is probably the ultimate hands-on exercise.

### **Are they really a company? Coalition patterns among the New Member States**

There have been increasingly frequent and increasingly effective coalitions between all or the majority of the new, post-communist members of the fifth enlargement. Factors such as similar problems, concerns and interests, proximity, comparable size and weight, socio-economic development and shared recent history play a role and may explain a coalition-building behaviour.

The coalition patterns between the New Member States may often be on regional configurations — the longstanding Visegrad Group, the Baltics, the Baltics plus Poland, Visegrad and the Baltics. The new members also cooperate with the small and medium-sized countries in the EU as being more flexible or having similar interests. Poland is in a league of its own as member of the G6 — the six biggest countries in the EU, with the most votes, but it rarely prefers this format as too exclusivist.

Germany is the most commonly referred partner among the old Member States, not only because of its weight and influence, and the fact that it is a major investor, but also because it is a close neighbour with similar interests. The UK and France also are among the major partners. The Scandinavian countries closely cooperate or coordinate with the Baltics and Poland.

### **Will there be changes in behaviour?**

In the short to medium-term perspective, a radical departure in the positions of the new members may not be expected. While some change in form might occur, it will be not a change of substance. Formulated positions and preferences are unlikely to be challenged, for at least several different reasons. First, significant domestic u-turns in domestic politics are not expected to take place. Second, even if this happens, there is a more structural factor at work: there is still an “EU consensus” among the mainstream political players. The Eurosceptic trends in domestic politics are weak and are neither dominant nor influential. The mainstream parties may have “federalist” vs. “intergovernmentalist” inclinations, but both camps are pro-European and unlikely to reverse key policies. Third, the formulated positions and preferences are often devised behind closed doors by governmental institutions, not really following a vigorous political or public debate. Hence, they are considered a somewhat “EU transcendental knowledge”, immune to change. Fourth, the positions are “national positions”, implying that they represent the crystallised “national interest”, not party or interest group-based as may otherwise be the case. Once in circulation, a “national interest” position is more difficult to change domestically.

### **The likely effects of the global crisis: another try at forecasting**

It may be too early to predict how the global economic crisis will affect the “EU policies” (leaving aside worst-case scenarios of EU fragmentation) of the New Member States but it may be worth trying. As the world plunges deeper into the crisis, the New Member States have been lumped together with other adjacent countries — quite indiscriminately — into the economically volatile “Eastern Europe”, an epicentre of the next big crash. In reality, one has to distinguish between the countries outside and inside the EU, and there are marked differences between the new members themselves too.

The economic strains of the crisis are definitely creating new social and political realities, as the governments of two of the hardest hit — Latvia and Hungary, were badly shaken.

But the response to the crisis has tested the New Member States and the responses have been indicative. For one thing, as the row over the President Sarkozy’s call to the French car industry ensued, the new members confirmed that they will continue to uphold liberal economic thinking vis-à-vis creeping protectionism. The end of what is dubbed “market fundamentalism” entails for the Member States a complete swing of the pendulum in the other direction. Furthermore, some of them are returning into the sway of the IMF, which actually taught them the first lessons in free market economy in the early transition.

The shared problems of the new members and the contrasting responses between the new and some old members have also brought the commonality of the New Member States once more to the fore, as they requested more solidarity and a coordinated approach demonstrated by the EU.

On more practical level, the New Member States will need more than ever a more open and free European market of labour and market of services to pull them out of the recession. But as jobs at home are disappearing, the countries will reconsider their policies for attracting outside, third-country labour force.

They will also become more assertive in seeking entry into the Euro zone, as this will be the ultimate anchor and antidote to financial collapse. In a somewhat paradoxical effect,

the crisis will help countries like Bulgaria and Estonia achieve the criteria for entering the ERMII, the door to the Euro zone, by pushing down their inflation levels.

**Don't shoot the messenger: disclaimer on the purpose of the project**

This report is not meant to create dividing lines between "new" vs. "old", "small" vs. "big" coalitions. The aim of the new members is ultimately to blend in with the crowd as "normal" and capable members of the EU, making equally important and legitimate contributions to the development of the European project. Therefore, this report, and the broader project it is part of, is intended solely to help raise the capacity of the New Member States to create equal and adequate authorship of EU policies.

## A G10? The New Member States on internal market policies

At the time of devising the methodology of this report, the New Member States were still the "tigers" of the European economy. A growth rate of 6-7% to the staggering 10-12% in the Baltics was considered rather the norm than the exception. As Lehman Brothers fell off the cliff, it soon became clear that the boom time was over for everyone. But as the crisis envelops the region, it is increasingly clear that despite country differences they have managed to maintain solidarity and a common approach.

<b>Growth in real GDP</b>				
	Projection			Estimate
	2006	2007	2008	2009
Bulgaria	6.3	6.2	6.3	2.0
Czech Republic	6.8	6.0	4.1	0.0
Estonia	10.4	6.3	-2.3	-3.5
Hungary	4.1	1.1	1.0	-2.0
Latvia	12.2	10.3	-1.7	-5.0
Lithuania	7.8	8.9	3.8	-2.5
Poland	6.2	6.6	5.0	1.5
Romania	7.9	6.0	8.0	1.0
Slovakia	8.5	10.4	7.0	2.5
Slovenia	5.9	6.8	4.3	1.5
<i>EBRD data and projections, 27 January 2009</i>				
Euro area	2.9	2.7	1.2	0.1
<i>EC data and projections, Autumn 2008</i>				

This was vividly demonstrated by a pre-Summit meeting of the prime ministers of nine new members in the Polish embassy ahead of the 1 March 2009 Summit. .

As the crisis continues, it may certainly be claimed that the group solidarity and common positions will solidify rather than wane. They have similar problems and need similar solutions at EU level for avoiding protectionism, for devising a new Euro policy, for opening the job markets and keeping them open, and for overall European solidarity in troubleshooting the crisis.

### "Anglo-Saxons" of CEE

The new members are, with minor exceptions, exactly on the same page on most of the economic issues of the EU (Slovenia may deviate from the rule). Liberalisation and further completion of the internal market are their main points of departure in addressing these issues on EU level. All of them have been acolytes of liberal

where they resist it.

Despite economic thinking the Anglo-Saxon way and have brought that attitude with them into the European Union. It is no surprise to see the new members siding with the UK, Ireland and Sweden on most of these issues (that was before the continental Europe of France and Germany switched places with the UK and the US on the perils of unfettered capitalism). The description may not always fit them though, as they promote "liberalisation" selectively — which is the case with many new members in the energy sector that it is over with market fundamentalism, by all accounts the new members would rather hold to the "Anglo-Saxon" spirit — that is, against growing protectionism and state intervention.

### What is important for them?

Priority Issues		Preferences
Free movement of workers	√	Yes, they support it very much and demand termination of the transitional periods, which impose barriers.
Free movement of services	√	Yes, they support it strongly as this gives them a competitive advantage.
Taxation harmonisation	X	No, they overtly reject it, as this would damage their economies.

Three outstanding issues (among those studied in the research) confirm this: the support for free movement of persons, the free movement of services and the killing of taxation harmonisation within the EU. Their arguments contain much self interest, but they actually back policies that are very much in line with the very basics of the EU — the four freedoms: freedom of movement of persons, movement of capital, goods and services. In taxation, they would like to retain a competitive advantage over the old members, to make an even playing field to catch up economically with the affluent Western Europe.

The New Member States were also very supportive, though more in the "Policy Takers" capacity, to an array of other policies related to the internal market. They supported merger regulations, Better Regulation and the EC Simplification Rolling Programme, the Small Business Act and developing integrated financial retail services as good moves for their economic development.

There has been a general consensus on the policies within the countries, among both politicians and business players, and it is unlikely that the stances will change dramatically in the future.

### **Read my lips: free movement of people and the new members**

The New Member States have been striving to get full access to the labour markets of the old Member States as most of them opted to close the labour markets to their new fellow Europeans. This felt as bad as it looked: first, the citizens of the new members cannot benefit from basic EU rights; second, the barriers severely limit labour flexibility and hence the productivity of the EU; third, the new members' governments have hard times to explain the politically frustrating issue to their electorate; and fourth, the new members really needed access to the labour markets of the richer West, as this pushes down unemployment figures and replenishes the budget with remittances from migrants.

There are actually three sets of issues related to the free movement of persons and the labour markets. The first one is the transition periods, i.e. the periods for which an old Member State may restrict access to its labour market. There is a 2+3+2 year formula, meaning that re-evaluation is done according to this formula and the restrictions cannot be extended after this seven-year period. The second one is the issue of different treatment of new member citizens and third-country labour migrants within the old members. The new members' concern is that programmes such as the "Blue Card" may paradoxically give precedence to third-country labour while the markets are closed to fellow EU members. The third one is the opening of the new members' own markets to attract labour from third countries, as before the global crisis some new members have had labour deficits because of their fast growth. Many have touted "circulation migration" mechanisms, but in the face of the economic downturn, they would now rather restrict access to their labour markets.

As far as the concrete responses are concerned, they have varied within different levels of rejection of the transition periods and support to lifting the barriers. Three New Member States — Hungary, Poland and Slovenia — reciprocated by closing their labour markets to the old EU in a demonstration of defiance, but they lifted the barriers shortly after. The New Member States have so far shown solidarity with one another, as they supported the "open door" stance to each other. Only Hungary imposed barriers to Bulgaria and Romania. But the group unity may wane soon, as they first group of 2004 entrants receives a different treatment from the 2007 group (Bulgaria and Romania). This is due to the different timing of expiration of the transition periods, and as the 2004 group's deadline will expire first the influence of the common interests may diminish.

### **First come, first served: the free movement of services**

The New Member States are very supportive towards the free movement of services, as they consider they have a competitive edge over the old Member States in this area. They have all maintained liberal stances, despite accusations of "job" and "employment policy dumping" — e.g. companies based in the old members will be disadvantaged vis-à-vis the new member companies and workers with their lower employment protection and lower safety standards. The whole debate is best exemplified by the *Laval un Partneri* case that started it: in 2004, a Latvian construction company working in Sweden raised controversies with the Swedish trade unions as it brought its Latvian workers to build a local school.

All of the countries may become "Policy Drivers" if the issue resurfaces again.

### **Policy Killers in action: the harmonisation of taxation**

"Tax Sovereignty" has been requested by the Christian Democrats in Slovakia, a country that has benefited a lot from its lower taxation level. This is very much the idea of all Member States and the key players in them.

The New Member States have revolted at the idea of taxation harmonisation. They reject the attempts at doing so, even linking that issue to the Lisbon Treaty as they demanded keeping the unanimous vote in the area of taxation, instead of introducing QMV (qualified majority voting), which might have imposed the rule some day.

As lower taxation represents one of their key advantages in attracting investment and boosting economic growth, it is very unlikely that they will change their stance any time soon.

On VAT (Value Added Tax) the New Member States support the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. they don't mind others using various VAT levels as long as a common level is not imposed on EU level. In general, the new members prefer not to use diverse VAT levels, as this is often their major budget source and there is the danger of opening the door to corporate interests requesting the benefits of a lower VAT levels.

Only the "common consolidated corporate tax base" stands a chance of receiving support from two new members: Hungary and, to a certain extent, Poland. The measures, directed at the EU-wide activities of big multinational companies, have been rejected by the rest of the new members, acting in the company of the UK, Ireland and Cyprus (no surprise that these countries joined forces in this case, given their economic policies).

The New Member States are unlikely to change their positions. The freedom to define their own taxation levels is crucial to their economic policies, attracting investors and keeping budget revenues high. The global economic crisis may even harden their positions to keep them competitive on European and global scale.

## Minorities: a minor issue on the EU agenda?

The new members' part of Europe is a patchwork of nations and ethnic minorities. But ethnic differences were suppressed during the communist era to be suddenly un-frozen during the transition period — adding the complex issue of regulating inter-ethnic relations to the already complicated agenda of political transformation.

In the run-up to entry into the EU, the Copenhagen political criteria were the benchmark guaranteeing that the basics of liberal democracy were achieved — including the rights of minorities. However, the EU has not really been the primary venue for managing inter-ethnic relations and after the negotiation process it lost any direct role in minority issues.

The new members themselves have been very reluctant to bring their ethnic issues to EU level. Even in the case of Roma integration, with a few exceptions, the New Member States attributed a supporting role to the EU — mainly as funds provider or copying models from other member states. In the run-up to entry into the EU, the treatment of Roma minorities was an oft-repeated and critical issue in the monitoring reports. But after entry into the EU, Roma integration was off the EU agenda and its role was mostly indirect — in case the national programmes on funds absorption earmarked money for Roma inclusion.

As far as other minorities are concerned, this has been strictly guarded within the domain of national affairs — and the EU in fact never had any intention to venture into this territory, with the exception of more indirect measures such as anti-discrimination legislation or cultural diversity programmes.

Proposed policies	Proponents and response	
<b>Overall EU Roma integration policy, institutionalised on EU level</b>	✓	Promoted by NGOs, Soros network as a driver, the Romanian and Hungarian governments
	X	Negative response, due to concerns of escalating demands by other minorities
<b>European Roma Strategy</b>	✓	Promoted by NGOs, Soros network as a driver, the Romanian and Hungarian governments
	X	EC responded by report, but the lukewarm response was criticised by the Policy Drivers
<b>Roma Unit at EC/ European Agency for the Roma</b>	✓	Promoted by NGOs, Soros network as a driver, the Romanian and Hungarian governments
	X	Likely negative response
<b>Funding for Roma Policies</b>	✓	Using existing structural and cohesion funds
	X	Alternative: a separate financial line; unlikely to be adopted
<b>EU legislation on minorities</b>	✓	Proposed by Hungary
	X	Likely to attract very negative responses across the board

### The Roma minority integration policies

The understanding of the centrality of Roma inclusion is broadly shared, as many new members — Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia — are home to large Roma communities. The neglect of Roma integration issues during the transition, when they were the hardest hit by hardships, raised the spectre of social and even ethnic tensions. Roma problems are virtually the same across the region — exclusion, poverty, and discrimination, with severe health, education, housing and employment problems. With the new wave of Roma migrations across Western Europe, backlash against Roma has raised serious inter-state issues (re-imposing visas for Czech citizens, the more serious tensions of 2008 and 2009 in Italy, etc.) and made the Roma issue an EU-wide flashpoint.

At home, national governments have been churning out programmes and action plans for Roma integration with varying success. While proposals have been in the right direction, underpinned by the understanding that these are social and not ethnic issues *per se*, they have yet to achieve convincing results.

The largest leap in the area was made by launching a specific public-private partnership, undertaken by a host of NGOs and CEE governments — the Decade of Roma Inclusion (with the central support by the Soros foundations network as a Policy Driver). The Decade serves as the focal point and blueprint for government actions. But with the exception of Romania and Hungary, most of the new members with a stake in

Roma integration policies prefer to keep their initiatives and support on national level, avoiding an ambitious EU-level policy. It is the non-governmental organisations that remain the strongest advocates for EU action in this area.

### **Elevating Roma integration to EU level: what are the proposals?**

Romania and Hungary, both home to large Roma communities, have been self-appointed Policy Drivers to elevate the Roma integration issue to EU level. In Romania's case, this came as a response to the 2008 backlash against the Romanian citizens of Roma origin in Italy. The only feasible solution seen in this case was to "communitarise" the issue by bringing in the EU.

The rationale of the proposed EU approach and institutionalisation is to compensate for the deficits of the national policies. The proposed solutions are both at policy and institutional levels. There should be a comprehensive Roma policy — i.e. a European Roma Strategy. The EU framework should set minimal benchmarks and standards, serving as an external anchor to the various national efforts and spurring and monitoring these policies and efforts. There should be institutionalisation of Roma policies in a separate European Agency for the Roma and a special Roma Unit within the European Commission.

The initial proposals say that they should not earmark special funds for Roma policies, as the current structural and cohesion funds offer enough opportunities for this purpose. Since the governments currently use such funds for Roma integration programmes, the assumption is that the EU-level policies and institutions will streamline and in fact channel the funds to the beneficiaries more efficiently (which may have not been the case until now). There is an alternative proposal to have a separate financial line for Roma integration policies.

### **Response and feasibility of the proposals for the Roma**

The chances of institutionalisation of a Roma policy or a comprehensive strategy are very slim. The main counter-argument is that this would open the door to other minorities' requests for similar treatment and further escalating demands. The concern is especially valid for the sizable Muslim minority in the EU, and as this would affect the big Member States they are likely opponents of any special minority treatment.

The other issue is that in principle, the EU Member States, and especially the new members, are very reluctant to involve the EU in managing inter-ethnic relations. The concern is that "internationalising" the issue might lead to further escalation of demands and imposing solutions that would endanger national sovereignty. This includes even Romania: although a Policy Driver on the Roma issue, it is reluctant to raise other minority cases because of concerns over the Hungarian minority, treating it as an exception of a social character.

The European Commission indeed did respond to the proposals for a special Roma policy by issuing a report on Roma inclusion in July 2008. But the report was more of a catalogue of existing measures and was criticised as being vague and indecisive. This indicates the general trend of the EU — to be very supportive but within limits.

### **Other minority issues: treat with care**

While the new members of the EU have never reached the boiling point of the Western Balkans in minority-majority relations, there has always been much sensitivity over minorities. Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, Turks in Bulgaria, Russians in the Baltics are all very different cases. But there has always been a lingering concern that the instrumental use of minority issues might endanger national sovereignty — through irredentism, requests for autonomy or outright secession. Latvia and Estonia have citizenship issues with the Russian minorities in the country, most of which are still treated as temporary residents. But the issue has profound ethical and geopolitical implications indeed, as it is viewed as a direct legacy of the occupation of these countries by the Soviet Union in the last century. Slovenia has a similar problem with the "Erased" former Yugoslav citizens, though to a lesser extent.

The interest in national minorities living in other states has prompted more active policies on the EU scene, such as Hungary's drive to secure relevant EU legislation (e.g. in the Charter of Fundamental Rights) with an eye on the rights of ethnic Hungarians abroad.

Different countries have opted for diverse models of inter-ethnic relations regulations, but Western liberal democratic standards have ensured the rights of the minorities and they have found ways to benefit. As a rule, the more sizable minorities in the New Member States (other than the Roma) tend to have strong political representation, positions in local authorities and often act as king-makers in the political process, giving them access to central government.

By all accounts, the EU has been viewed as a power for good for mitigating inter-ethnic tensions, but the main leverage has always been its "soft power". Neither the Member States nor the EU as a whole would like to have inter-ethnic relations brought to centre stage in the European Union.

## The new members and CAP: just another new vs. old rift

### Cheaper by the dozen

The New Member States do not want to see a substantial change in the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), but this does not mean they are satisfied with the current state of affairs.

Probably the two most outstanding issues are the increase of levels of aid and the inequality between the aid received by their farmers and the farmers in the old Member States. 2008 data says that the New Member States receive about 6% of the direct aid funds from the EU budget for agriculture. The remaining 94% goes to old Member States. In the second pillar of CAP, rural development, the new members receive about 33% of the funds (estimates courtesy of <http://caphealthcheck.eu/>, 10 July 2008).

The New Member States attach big importance to the agricultural sector, despite the fact that in many countries its share in their economies is dwindling. Still, the issue is politically significant, as large portions of the population live in rural areas and are employed in the sector (30% of the workforce in Romania, 15.6% in Poland, 12.4% in Lithuania), and food prices are a salient public topic. Thus the promise of EU's direct aid and rural development funds is a key component of the domestic political debate.

For the majority of the New Member States, the significance of CAP and the reluctance to radically change it ensues from the fact that CAP, and especially its first pillar of direct aid, is quite attractive, representing a convenient redistributive mechanism *per se*, in which they can benefit relatively easily.

For Romania, the CAP entails a higher stake as it is aiming at the agriculture commissioner's seat in the 2009 European Commission.

Priority issues		Preferences
<b>Total overhaul of CAP</b>	X	No, they want conservative reform (Estonia is an exception).
<b>Abolition of direct aid</b>	X	No, they reject it. Estonia is an exception; Lithuania also would support it in the long term, but not now.
<b>Change the focus to rural development</b>	-	They think it is necessary, but this should not be at the expense of direct aid (first pillar).
<b>Different levels of payments for "new" and "old" farmers</b>	X	No, they want to speed up the measures towards equal payments as soon as possible.
<b>Historical reference indicators, resulting in higher levels of aid for old members</b>	X	No, they want review of the policy for equal conditions between new and old and fair competition.
<b>Simplify the Single Payment System (applicable now for old members)</b>	✓	Yes, they want to keep the SAPS — Single Area Payment System — that is designed specifically for them as long as possible, and then introduce a simplified Single Payment System.

### Coalition patterns in CAP

First, there is the new vs. old members' rift, registered above, and hence the coalition of the New Member States. Then there is the larger, and perhaps more important coalition comprised of all EU members with stakes in CAP. Finally, there is the mini-coalition of the latest arrivals in the EU — Bulgaria and Romania.

### Debate on reforming the CAP


The agriculture funds take a notoriously big share of the EU budget — currently about 40% (61% in 1988, aiming for 32% in 2013). It takes equally notorious pain for the EU to negotiate a CAP reform, including the recently launched CAP Health Check exercise. The debate is basically about how big the CAP funds with the EU budget should be — with an intention to decrease and channel the money towards other policies. There is also the question of what the ratio should be between Pillar I and II of CAP — that is, direct aid and rural development funds, respectively. The first, simply put, is about supporting traditional patterns of agriculture, while the second entails modernising projects for the villages of the region. Finally, everything is boiled down to how much

money each of the Member States is getting as a result of tinkering with the different items and mechanisms within the CAP budget.

### Things they like and things they want to change

There are several issues on the CAP reform agenda. On the principled issue of what kind of reform is necessary, all New Member States but one insist on a conservative reform that will not touch the basics of CAP.

Estonia is the revolutionary among the group as it would agree to abolish direct aid to farmers. But in Estonia's case, the share of agriculture is miniscule — 1.8% of GDP in 2007, down from 22.01% in 1989 — so it does not have the stakes the other countries do.



Lithuania, while accepting the conservative approach in the short term, in the longer term is supportive of radical reform of CAP that would slash down the spending and may abolish the CAP altogether. The main argument of Lithuania is that this will safeguard the EU from the budgetary shocks of future enlargements, when more and more aid will be directed to new members with large agriculture sectors (namely, Turkey and Ukraine).

While getting fewer funds is frustrating, getting no funds at all would be a disaster. The idea that the Member States should cover all or part of the costs now covered by CAP from their national budgets was floating around but has been scrapped for now.

The new members support having more money for rural development, but do not accept doing that by shifting money from direct aid (Pillar I) to the rural areas (Pillar II). The solution to the dilemma is to increase the overall budget of CAP, which is not quite feasible in time of budget cuts.

### Fighting for a even playing field

The inequality between new and old Member States is high on the agenda. Undoing this injustice, according to the new, should be done in the following ways: first, the direct aid differences should be narrowed at a quicker pace — from 15 to 50% annually, up from the current 10% pace. A coalition of new members — Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia — was established to advocate for it. In a similar attempt, they have been trying to change the so-called historic approach to direct aid for farmers (based on previous payments), which benefits old Member States.

New members (Bulgaria and Slovenia) are also against setting a minimal size of lots — at 1ha — as their farms are mostly small. In Bulgaria's case, the government also objected the setting a minimal size of aid allocations, as this would disqualify the poorest farmers.

The New Member States also don't favour cross compliance — the provision linking aid to fulfilling environmental, animal welfare standards, etc. — as this would put their small and poorer farms in a disadvantaged position. As they cannot remove the measure, they seek to minimise the damage through the transition periods. Bulgaria and Romania have formed a mini-coalition to push back the deadline to 2016 and to demand specific requirements to mitigate the negative effects on farmers.

## “Drill, baby, drill”: the New Member States on the energy and climate package of the EU

When looking into the positions of the old and the new Member States on the energy and climate package, an outside onlooker might jump to the conclusion that the old members are some “New Age” tree huggers and the new members are — figuratively speaking — still in the steam age in their efforts to boost industry. The old members are pushing for lower carbon caps and stricter environmental rules, and many detest nuclear energy. The New Member States demand fewer rules and boosting of such hard-core technologies as nuclear power and coal electricity generation. Thus the new members might fully subscribe to the US Republicans’ 2008 slogan — “drill, baby, drill” — implying a similar passionate support to energy sector policies associated with environmental concerns (the US case differed in the detail as referred to supporting off-shore drilling; the new members probably would do the same, only if they had access to the reserves).


The New Member States think otherwise. First, they consider that it is not them that are big polluters, as they easily covered the Kyoto Protocol requirements when their industries crumbled in the early transition. Second, they need laxer environmental rules and ample energy generation in order to catch up in terms of economic development. Their argument is that another EU policy to which they are already committed — the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs — takes precedence over the new ambitious environmental goals. Third, for many countries energy security is a vital national interest to guarantee sovereignty.

Policy proposals		Policy preferences and actions
Nuclear energy	√	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Yes, they love it, some more than others.</li> <li>▪ They seek better attitudes at EU level and will go on with building new capacities.</li> </ul>
External dimension of energy policy	X/√	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Mixed record;</li> <li>▪ Formally, they all support it;</li> <li>▪ In practice, they pursue different objectives.</li> </ul>
Liberalisation 3 <sup>rd</sup> package	X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ No, they don’t like it.</li> <li>▪ Three new members joined a strong EU-wide coalition to kill the proposals; a compromised version has been reached.</li> </ul>
Post-Kyoto approach	√	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Yes, they support it;</li> <li>▪ But want US, China and India on board.</li> </ul>
Greenhouse gas emissions and the Emission Trading Scheme	X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ No, they don’t like it;</li> <li>▪ A strong coalition built around Poland defied the proposals.</li> </ul>

Domestic political and foreign policy considerations are running high. There are also considerable business interests, as energy projects usually amount to billions of euro. However, it seems that the positions of the New Member States in their current shape have reached a level of political, public and business consensus, and abrupt changes are not expected.

### Nuclear energy: the more, the better

Plans for new power plants and reactors are deliberated in practically every country in the region. The CEE states promote or are supportive towards policy change at the EU level, which would facilitate nuclear energy (Finland and France are building and considering new nuclear reactors; the UK and the Netherlands are considering the options and Italy has laid out ambitious plans; and even Germany’s politicians are thinking about it).



*The nuclear powers among the New Member States: 7 out of 10 have nuclear power plants.*

The New Member States are trying to move nuclear energy away from its controversial political and environmental image to transform it into all but “green” technology, indispensable to economic growth and energy security.

But they are by no means a uniform group as far as nuclear energy is concerned. The keenest are those with nuclear power stations in operation, that intend to enhance production either by adding reactors to existing sites or building new ones.

#### **Why nuclear should be good enough for anyone: arguments for policy promotion**

There is no uniform set of reasons for the support of nuclear energy as they vary from country to country, but the following list is quite indicative:

- Energy security in general is often cited as a major factor. Nuclear power stations have large generation capacities (in some countries delivering more than half of the output — 56% for Slovakia, 70% for Lithuania, some 30-40% in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic) and they do diversify supply and the country’s energy mix;
- The external dimension of energy security is also an important cause, as the energy is produced domestically and presumably involves fewer foreign policy implications;
- The electricity is generated at competitive prices, which would be good for the economy and consumers;
- It offers a profitable source of income, presumably through electricity exports;
- It is good for the environment, as nuclear power plants do not emit harmful greenhouse gases. In some cases, nuclear power plants are indispensable for reaching emission targets (as in Lithuania), when other alternatives are missing.

#### **Nuclear energy: what are they doing to achieve their goals?**

Since becoming full-fledged EU members, the New Member States have become more assertive in pursuing the vindication of nuclear energy. The interest in nuclear energy has already been translated in action in two directions: (a) promotion of policy change at the EU level and (b) planned construction of nuclear energy facilities.

Bulgaria and Slovakia are probably the two most ardent proponents as reflected in their plans to develop their nuclear energy sectors. Bulgaria is constructing one new power plant in Belene, deliberating the building of two more reactors on the site of the Kozloduy plant, and there is a controversial ongoing campaign to reopen reactors closed under the accession treaty. Slovakia has plans for three new nuclear power stations: the third and fourth blocks of the power station at Mochovce, new reactors to replace the closed ones in Jaslovské Bohunice, and a new power station at Kecerovce.

Romania is constructing two reactors and may develop a new, second plant in Transylvania. Also planning to add reactors to existing power plants are the Czech Republic (two at Temelin) and Slovenia (one in Krsko) and Hungary is deliberating on such an option. The countries that do not currently have nuclear plants are somewhat less enthusiastic, but their support is growing. Poland, Estonia and Latvia are discussing a joint investment scheme in Lithuania’s nuclear power plant and Poland is considering

“outsourcing” a nuclear power plant in Western Ukraine or building two for itself in the country.

### **Nuclear energy: the drive for policy change at the EU level**

The policy change promotion pursues a more favourable environment for the sector, not devising a common policy per se. Nuclear policy is a national competence and the decisions to have or not have a nuclear power plant depends on the Member States, not on Brussels: no one wants to complicate things by changing this. Its proponents want nuclear energy to be treated as an emission-free technology and further extend the argument to put nuclear on an equal footing with renewable sources (e.g. Bulgaria’s position). The drive to treat nuclear energy generation as being close to “green” and/or renewable technology” is not just moral vindication for the industry. It also has very practical implications for at least two reasons. The first is that, in case it is treated as “renewable”, there will be no need for further investment to keep up with EU requirements for the share of renewable energy sources. The second reason is that this would increase public acceptance, which is critical in attaining state legislative and financial support or third-party investment (the cost of a new nuclear power plant starts at EUR 4-5 billion), as noted also in the EC’s Update of the Nuclear Illustrative Programme of 2008, accompanying the EU’s Second Strategic Energy Review.

### **Nuclear energy in the political and the domestic “European” debate**

The vindication of nuclear energy transcends its technical and economic rationale as it is part of more complex domestic political and foreign policy debate. For many of the CEE populations, the nuclear reactors also strongly relate to national pride, symbolising progress, economic might and even sovereignty.

Nuclear energy was a big issue for many CEE countries in the run-up to entry into the EU. The requirement to close down reactors was part and parcel of the accession,

**Public support for nuclear energy, Eurobarometer 297, June 2008**

Country	Support %
Czech Republic	64
Lithuania	64
Hungary	63
Bulgaria	60
Slovakia	60
Slovenia	51
<i>EU average</i>	<i>44</i>
Estonia	41
Poland	39
Latvia	35
Romania	35

enshrined in the treaties, in an effort by Western European politicians to alleviate fears in their states of the Soviet-era nuclear industry in the East. Many citizens in the candidate states perceived with bitterness the closing of reactors as an unfair bargain — i.e. reactors vs. membership — to the point that it was (mis)used as a political argument for Euroscepticism. The problems included frictions between neighbouring states — e.g. Austria vs. Czech Republic and Slovakia — and conspiracy theories, saying that the reason is to make way for Western technology and companies to sell electricity instead. Thus, CEE politicians remain under pressure from both the public and interest groups to re-energise the nuclear sector — and the politicians themselves picked on the popular issue to increase their public support. To be sure, there is no overwhelming political and public consensus in CEE countries, as independent policy experts, economists and environmentalists warn against economic folly, environmental hazards or dependence on third countries for the investment, technology and fuel (Russia, most of all). As indicated by the public opinion polls, the support for nuclear energy runs high, with the CEE countries as a rule far above the EU average.

Nuclear energy was even linked to the institutional debate, with groups in Bulgaria and Slovakia saying that the two countries should have leveraged support for the Lisbon Treaty in exchange for permission to re-open nuclear reactors.

### **The counter-arguments of nuclear energy sceptics**

The push for a stronger nuclear energy sector is not perceived equivocally in the New Member States and the arguments for its support have been repudiated. The economic benefits are countered by the high costs of investment as the price tag of one nuclear power plant starts at EUR 4-5 billion and the further multimillion costs for maintenance, purchase and disposal of fuel, etc. The argument based on “energy security”, including its external dimension, is also questioned, as in most cases a nuclear plant would end up with Russia supplying the fuel — exactly counter to the original aim to move away from heavy dependence on Russia. But increasing the legitimacy of nuclear energy at EU level will further erode the positions of its opponents at home. Environmentalists,

politicians and citizens who fear too much energy dependence, for whom “Brussels” has been the key ally, might lose another line of defence.

Finally, with the global economic crisis hitting the New Member States hard, and the states and investors likely to be cash-stripped for years to come, some of the projects’ implementation may be pushed back for years.

### **Single definitions that make all the difference: the External Dimension of Energy Policy**

For the record, all New Member States support a common external energy policy of the European Union, emanating from their concern over energy security as they are net importers of energy resources.

But the problem is that they use different definitions of “diversification” for achieving “energy security”, ending up with divergent views on external energy policy. This is a case where the broadly-defined end goals have largely divergent, if not conflicting paths for their achievement.

In essence, the difference is that one group considers that energy security is achieved by diversification of energy resources — that is, an adequate mix of gas, oil, and electricity generation, possibly including multiple routes for delivery. The other group thinks exactly the same, but considers that the sources and respective routes should have different origins.

This difference is in practice undermining the announced will for a common European approach and is bringing about a re-nationalisation of policies.

Nearly all of the New Member States are heavily dependent on the import of energy, and their biggest, and most often the only, supplier is Russia. This brings in a strong geopolitical and domestic political component of bilateral relations. The attitudes towards Moscow are anything but “business as usual” in the former Communist states, as they are burdened with historical sensitivities and current concerns of neo-imperial behaviour by Russia. Energy security and the external dimension of energy policy are defined to a great extent as domestic political debates as well as foreign policy, including neighbourhood policy, and ultimately shape the common European approach.

### **The common ground in the external dimension of energy policy**

As far as the common ground among the CEE countries is concerned, it seems that all of them take the external energy policy and energy security very seriously. The Slovak government’s Strategy of Energy Security declares that the energy security threat is more serious than direct military or asymmetric threats, while energy policy is one of Bulgaria’s top three foreign policy issues.

The countries have identical positions, supporting the development and implementation of a coordinated External Energy Policy of the European Union which would guarantee supply and better conditions for the delivery, transit and prices of imports as well as sustainable energy production and consumption. They all concede that the external dimension of energy security includes diversification of sources and routes, coordinated dialogue with the producing countries and consumers of energy resources, as well as with transit countries (as defined in this case by Bulgaria’s government).

On a practical level, these positions and definitions translate into policies and projects worth tens of billions of euro. And when the gas crisis of January 2009 affected a third of the EU, it demonstrated that the “external energy policy” — or rather the lack of a common one — has a very tangible impact on the everyday lives of millions of EU citizens.

### **Shared goal, divergent end results**

But the ways to achieve energy security are dividing these countries into two very distinctive groups. For one group of countries, dialogue with the producing countries and diversification means in practice a deeper cooperation with Russia and more routes to import Russia’s energy resources. Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia regard Russia as their main energy partner, which will guarantee Europe’s energy supply in decades to come. A former Bulgarian energy minister offered an interesting explanation when he claimed that “energy security will be achieved through furthering interdependence with

Russia". This echoes similar European assumptions that while Europe is dependent on Russia's oil and gas, in the same manner Russia is dependent on Europe's cash flows.

The sceptics say the EU's own common energy policies are still a fiction, common projects are often inadequately backed both politically and financially, and that the best thing to do is to emulate what bigger and more influential states — Germany, Italy — are doing to secure their energy supply.

### **The independence and solidarity group in energy policy**

On the other side of the divide is a group of countries, for which the primary goal of external energy policy and energy security is breaking away from dependence on Russia. Poland and the Baltics — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — have their historical experience and current concerns to make them more aware of Russia's domination in the energy sector. The Czech Republic and Slovenia are following mid-way policies of decreasing dependence on Russia, but concerns are not so exposed.

The Baltics are especially vulnerable as they represent "an energy island" within the EU: they are not connected to major EU energy grids, but are still linked to the old post-Soviet system, dependent on Russia.

Poland, again in the role of "super Policy Driver" here, has so far tabled three key proposals that would change the rules to a great extent. The first one is the establishment of an "Energy NATO". Though attractive to many, it was rejected when proposed in 2006 as it was considered politically unacceptable. Still, the idea pops up now and then, possibly because of the connotation of confidence and efficiency that "NATO" brings with it.

The second Polish proposal came in 2008, when the government proposed a revision of the energy solidarity clause so that an EU reaction would be guaranteed should a delivery from external sources drop significantly.

The third proposal may seem the most simple, but makes all the difference. It is the definition of "diversification" that Poland successfully advocated for and was accepted by the European Commission. The definition says that there should be a diversification of geographical sources, not only a diversification of resources used for energy production. In practice, this means that a country should not only maintain (1) a balanced energy mix (the ratio between gas, oil, electricity from coal and nuclear, etc.). It should receive its energy imports not only (2) through different routes but also (3) from different sources — for example not just two pipelines from one source (e.g. Russia), but pipelines bringing oil or gas from a different country of origin.

### **Policy and political implications for the energy policy**

The different approaches towards the external energy policy have consequences for the EU's common energy policy in general as well as for concrete energy projects.

On the normative level we may be witnessing a trend in "re-nationalisation" of policies, rather than a true common European policy. The New Member States, however, are not the perpetrators of the problem, as had there been a more coherent EU approach they would not have strayed far from the mainstream.

On the practical level, huge projects such as Nabucco are being affected by the lack of a consolidated approach. The EU as a whole has failed continuously to act together and as long as such a complex and expensive project (at a price tag of EUR 7.9 billion) is out of reach of the new and small countries, they are going to choose other options as they see fit.

It is often claimed that the gas war of January 2009 was a wakeup call and there will be genuine diversification, leading ultimately to energy security. This may be the case to some extent, but so far the initiatives are limited to small interconnectedness projects that can help in limited cases for a limited period.

### **Liberalisation in the energy sector: thanks, but no thanks**

While the New Member States are carrying out liberal policies and support less regulation and more openness, some of them have been vigorously fighting the liberalisation of the energy markets. Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovakia have joined a group of Member States (also including Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece and

Luxemburg) seeking to kill provisions of the 3<sup>rd</sup> liberalisation package — advocated by strong proponents such as the UK and the Netherlands.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> package aimed at achieving a truly competitive sector, including through minimising the domination of the so-called “national champions”, that is, the big national energy companies.

The states that opposed the proposed measures were especially concerned about the “unbundling” effect, which would fully separate the ownership of the transmission grids and the energy generation. Latvia and Slovakia directly defied both the unbundling of ownership (the provision that the same company could not simultaneously own a distribution network and produce or supply energy) and the independent system operator model, which was offered as a middle ground.

Other New Member States, while not so openly opposing the 3<sup>rd</sup> package, were not very happy about it. Estonia considered that without real inter-connectedness within the EU, the liberalisation would make little sense, but it did not go as far as Latvia to defy the proposals. Romania accepted liberalisation, but in practice went ahead with consolidating the state companies in the sector.

The arguments for resisting the changes in liberalisation boil down to economic and geopolitical reasons. On the economic side, there were concerns about unnecessarily weakening the (usually smaller) national companies vis-à-vis the strong multinationals, as well as strong lobbying on behalf of these big companies. Geopolitical concerns were also at the top, mostly related to monster companies such as Gazprom and the political influence that accompanies it, endangering their national interests or security.

In fact, the two arguments — weakening the national companies and third-party influence — were not necessarily linked or shared in practice by the countries that opposed the liberalisation package. They joined together, united by the same final goal but for different reasons.

### Reaching a compromise on liberalisation

<b>Public concerns about global warming and climate change, EB69.2, September 2008</b>		The compromise solution, forged at the 9-10 October 2008 Meeting of the Energy Council of the EU, in practice provided that the Member States could choose their model — either full or partial unbundling. This allowed the big companies — or “national champions” — to retain their power through ownership of the gas and electricity grids. But they would be subjected to an outside regulation and supervision. Companies from partially unbundled countries are also forbidden to buy grids in countries that have opted for the full unbundling model.
Country	Support %	
Slovenia	<b>80</b>	The third-party clause — or “Gazprom clause” as it is also known — was introduced to oblige non-EU energy companies, operating in the EU, to follow the same rules as the EU ones. This aims to prevent them from undue influence in gaining control over distribution networks in the Member States. The initial (harder) option provided that the EU as a whole would be involved in the case, making it stronger on the negotiation table. The specific condition that would make this possible was the requirement that the country of origin of the company deciding to buy should provide the same rights to any EU company. The new — soft— option leaves the door open to bilateral talks and arrangements.
Hungary	<b>71</b>	
Slovakia	<b>66</b>	
Lithuania	<b>66</b>	
<i>EU average</i>	62	
Romania	<b>60</b>	
Latvia	<b>58</b>	
Estonia	<b>58</b>	
Bulgaria	52	
Poland	50	
Czech Republic	45	The Czech Presidency in the first half of 2009 is continuing the talks on the package, but it will build on a compromise which is generally accepted, and complicated negotiations are not expected.
* <i>The bold numbers indicate that the issue is the top concern of the public.</i>		<b>The climate change and the new “Warsaw Pact”: this time victorious</b>

The “Warsaw Declaration” of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia in September 2008 is a case of coalition building over the climate change policies. They emphasised their contribution to the EU as a whole for reaching the Kyoto targets and that this has to be taken into account when devising the future policies of the Union. The place — Warsaw — is not a coincidence, as Poland has pooled the interests and efforts of the New Member States first to “kill” the proposed changes and

then as a “super Policy Driver” to amend the policies in the desired direction. The coalition, led by Poland, united for common action again at the October 2008 European Council, and as the entire energy and climate package was in trouble, the presidency pushed back the deadlines in the hopes of reaching an agreement.

In December 2008, Poland hosted a meeting between the presidency of the EU and the rest of the rebel group — Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia — which laid the ground for finally reaching consensus later in that month.

### **The climate change package**

The European Union has been very proud that it leads the globe against climate change as it comes up with different policies aimed at limiting emissions. But a group of nine New Member States have, as recently as December 2008, achieved a victory in curbing EU’s new plans associated with climate change. This raises two questions: in the first place, what exactly does this rift between the New Member States and the rest of the EU implies, including the ramifications for EU’s entire energy and climate change package? And second, how it is going to impact the image and the consequent actions of the EU as a “green power”?

To claim that the New Member States are “environmentally unfriendly” would be oversimplification. Yes, it is true that in general they advocate for laxer rules and warn that the EU’s efforts may undermine its own development through the so-called “carbon leakage”, that is, industries may choose other countries that are more tolerant to their business.

On public opinion level, climate issues receive a great deal of attention from the citizens of the New Member States. In a recent Eurobarometer survey (September 2008, No 69.2) the results showing concerns for the global warming and climate change were above or close to the EU average. As the respondents had to rate their concerns among eight global challenges (shortage of food and water, armed conflict, etc), in most cases the climate issues topped the list before other concerns. The countries with a lower level of concerns also had a lower level of information on the issues (Bulgarians, Romanians, Lithuanians and Czechs; it is an open question why citizens of Bulgaria and the Czech Republic perceived international terrorism as the main threat, with 70% and 56% respectively).

### **Yes to Kyoto, but mind the consequences**

A closer look at the matters reveals a certain paradox — actually the New Member States are very supportive of the Kyoto Protocol and the EU’s leading role in it, but they do object to the EU’s proposals for benchmarks for emissions and the Emission Trading Scheme.

The reason for this behaviour is fairly simple. All the New Member States, except Slovenia, are successfully achieving the Kyoto target goals, but the EU’s newly proposed regulations would put a substantial burden on their industries. The stricter regulations, the New Member States reasoned, would severely limit the policies of “catching up” with the rest of the EU and leave them less developed, second tier countries. These positions as a rule enjoyed wide political support and the argument played well with the local public. The powerful energy and industry lobbies have done their best to prevent stricter rules. Foreign investors would not bid on a country that has fewer emissions quotas, in a process very similar to the “carbon leakage” concerns for the whole of the EU (i.e. the reallocation of industries to third countries with less strict regimes). Therefore, there is unlikely to be any change in their positions in the short and medium-term future.

The new members have been a cautious voice in the EU on a too-zealous climate change policy. As the Czech Republic has argued, if the global effort does not include China, India, the US and other major players, then all the enormous efforts of the EU would be forfeit. If the EU continues to make sacrifices alone, its competitive advantages will be severely limited at the gain of only 1% decrease in global pollutions.

### **Renewables**

In the related area of usage of renewables, there has been a similar reluctance to see strict rules, despite the countries having agreed to the set limits. There is also deep

frustration with the way the targets have been set, which would undermine these countries' development efforts.

The reasons for objecting to the policies are anything but uniform, as the countries have different starting positions and capacities. For example, the use of renewables in the Czech Republic (5% with a target of 14% by 2020) or Bulgaria (9.4% to 16% by 2020) is viewed as difficult or unrealistic to achieve. They claim that achieving realistic goals is possible only if nuclear energy is recognised as an equally "green" technology as the renewable, as it does not emit greenhouse gas. Bulgaria openly lobbied for this and others vest their hopes on it.

For example, Poland is certainly frustrated as its carbon-based energy sector and industry is in a very unfavourable position. Latvia shares similar feelings for all different reasons: it has already achieved well above the average 20% target, but it has now been required to reach for 40%. Latvia prefers that countries with current 20% and above usage should not be subjected to higher ceilings, as they have already made their contribution and an extra effort would damage their competitiveness. The average target should be around 20%.


In general, there has been a preference for introducing more country-specific benchmarks, as the unified approach is not necessarily rational. In Estonia, the making of bio fuels has been deemed as creating more emissions than using carbons, and others, such as Slovenia, take the obligations more for their disciplining effect than with the realistic expectation that they would be met.

### **Revised Emission Trading Scheme**

The revised ETS has also been unpopular with the New Member States. In the first round of the ETS, many industries from the new members decided to sell their quotas, rather than utilise them — for example, the Lithuanian ones saved 47.3% of the credits and sold 69% to other European enterprises in 2006. The Commission then halved most of the requested quotas, causing much dissatisfaction as the New Member States initially planned to invest the funds from sold quotas into green technologies. This was certainly perceived with frustration by national industries, which saw governments unable to stand for their interests — like in Bulgaria or Latvia, where the concerned business groups requested that the government bring the issue to the European Court of Justice. Similar requests were made from Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Estonia (as Lithuania has done before).

The Slovak government also supported a system of benchmarks and their dynamic modification in specific sectors of the economy. It sought the decision on the list of sectors with a risk of carbon leakage as soon as possible, together with comprehensive rules and criteria for the risk assessment of industry delocalisation.

## A region with a mission: the enlargement, neighbourhood and defence policies



The common foreign and defence policies occupy a very high share of the “EU policies” of the New Member States and the enlargement and neighbourhood policies are the centrepiece of their foreign policies. This explains the attention assigned to these issues in domestic and European policy making. The issues are often closely related to an array of other policies —energy policy, the interest in national minorities residing in adjacent states, and domestic politics.

The new members demonstrate high support for enlargement, high support for a more robust Neighbourhood Policy and a “one-voice” Europe with a stronger role in the world too, registered in the institutional debate of the EU.

### The location rule

“Location, location, location” is the golden rule in the real estate market. It seems that a similar rule applies to the enlargement and neighbourhood policies as the New Member States are more interested in their immediate neighbours and seek to shape the EU’s policies according to their interests. All countries are active in one way or another proposing initiatives and trying to shift the EU’s focus south-eastward and eastward. Both the Slovenian and Czech Presidencies of the EU in 2008 and 2009 made strong cases for enlargement to the Balkans and deepening of commitments to the Eastern neighbours.

But at times this interest may be a double blessing, as it can go either way: either fervent and unconditional support or obstinate blockade towards their neighbour’s aspirations (despite that the causes may seem petty to the outside observer). Croatia’s case is indicative in this respect as it receives support from the majority of the New Member States but is currently stopped by its Slovenian neighbour because of a border dispute.

The New Member States’ interests are reflected in two sets of preferences: first, for specific countries and second, for specific policies.

### Overview of the preferences

<b>Outcome</b>	Membership	Croatia Serbia	Republic of Macedonia	Ukraine Moldova Turkey <i>Kosovo?</i> <i>Georgia?</i>
	Privileged partnership (?)			<i>Turkey?</i>
	Closer partnership (?)	Georgia		Belarus
		Fast track	Mid term	Long term
<b>Timeframe</b>				

The interest of new members in shaping the enlargement and neighbourhood policies can be best described as pushing the boundaries of the EU beyond their own external borders so that they would no longer be borderlands themselves or exposed to an unstable periphery. They want the enlargement to continue, and they want the Neighbourhood Policy to be made coherent and functional.

A bird's eye view of the positions of the New Member States reveals that a handful of countries — Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Moldova — are considered favourites for enlargement. This runs against current realities, as neither Serbia nor Ukraine are candidate countries (Ukraine and Moldova are not even on the official list of potential candidates), but reflects the recognised interest and good will of their neighbours. There is also intense commitment to deepen engagement with Georgia to help the country pull through the grave current crisis and sustain its Western orientation. The opening of negotiations with Macedonia is also supported, provided the country demonstrates political stability (hopefully it did so at the last presidential elections of 2009) and resolves the name debate with Greece.

### **An unexpected side effect: coupling of enlargement and neighbourhood policies**

As these drives take shape, there have been somewhat unexpected outcomes. The pace and scope of EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans has received an external impetus with reasons partially or fully unrelated to their local dynamics. A host of New Member States want the Western Balkans in the EU as soon as possible, in order to open the way for a next round of enlargement — this time to the current "Eastern neighbourhood" countries such as Ukraine and Moldova.

As this argument goes (Lithuania is indicative of this school of thought), the quicker the Western Balkans enter the EU, the sooner a next round of enlargement towards the current Eastern neighbourhood neighbours may be started. The accession would also be used as a case study and a precedent to advance the cause of another country. The Republic of Macedonia is seen as such an example for Moldova because of its similar size or maybe problems. Turkey's and Ukraine's perspectives have often been compared and linked. The Western Balkans region's fortune is seen as a precursor of that of the current Eastern neighbourhood countries.

### **Expanding or consolidating?**

There is one school of thought, as in the German Christian Democrats' programme of March 2009, that says a consolidation of the EU's identity and institutions is necessary before proceeding with any enlargement (Croatia excluded). Alarmed by the drawbacks of Bulgaria and Romania's accession, the political turmoil in the Western Balkans and the post-Soviet space, and mired in the ongoing economic crisis, the EU is no mood to think about expansion.

But ultimately, the new members' position on the strategic significance of enlargement and further commitments to the EU's neighbourhood may win the day — after all, it was Germany's recent presidency that bolstered a new Eastern policy.

### **Not as fast as it seems**

The drive to enlarge does not blindfold the New Member States. Formally, there are only two candidate countries in the Western Balkans — Croatia and Macedonia, but Skopje has not even received a date for starting negotiations yet. The other countries are considered potential candidates only, so in practice the EU enlargement towards the region is not foreseen in the short term.

A closer look at their positions reveals an approach that takes into consideration the positions of their counterparts in the EU, as they realise the futility of efforts without the heavyweights on their side. There is a complex interplay with other policies and considerations too: energy security and relations with Russia in the case of the Eastern policies. Domestic politics in the New Member States also have a critical impact on the policy choices made and the levels of enthusiasm.

The progress towards reform of the candidate and potential candidates is also taken into account as a token of their own commitment to accession or deeper relations with the EU. The progress is often measured against the benchmarks of the new members' own experiences in the accession process. This means that no short cuts to membership with laxer rules would be accepted.

The final outcome is a more nuanced approach that is intended to keep the flame of the debate alive, to keep the door open so that the reform process in the neighbouring countries can continue. This is probably one of the key lessons learned from their own reform and accession processes — the value of the presence of an anchor such as the EU.

### Proselytes: arguments for enlargement and neighbourhood policies

The New Member States — governments and the public alike — are very supportive and even enthusiastic about further enlargement or consolidating the neighbourhood policies. There is a legitimate question why they do that, despite the understanding that their counterparts in the West are less than keen to make further commitments in that direction and get entangled in activities they find controversial. The new members' arguments for enlargement and neighbourhood policies are essential for understanding the policy choices they make.

First, these states are located on the periphery of the EU and they feel vulnerable to outside shocks and spill-over effects. Therefore, there is a drive to stabilise adjacent countries through greater involvement of the EU, either through the enlargement process or the enhanced Neighbourhood Policy. For the countries around the Balkans, the challenge is political instability, interethnic volatility and unfinished state fragmentation. For those further East, there is the apprehension of a more assertive and unpredictable Russia. Helping their neighbours is a way to prevent geopolitical ruptures next door.

Second, energy security features high on the agenda, as the majority of the New Member States are dependent on energy imports from Russia. These imports are transited through the neighbourhood states, and guaranteeing the transit routes is essential. In fact, this is a major argument for "selling" neighbourhood policies to the EU as a whole.

Third, there is definitely a sense of solidarity and idealistic mission in the New Member States to help their neighbours advance on the accession or neighbourhood path. This is equally shared by governments and civil society organisations, who are often drivers of enlargement or neighbourhood policies, warning of another Iron Curtain that might cut off the natural economic, trade and human flows.

Fourth, the own experience of the New Member States is that the best medicine for transforming a country is the enlargement process per se. They know that the conditionality applied in the accession negotiations far exceeds the leverages in the Neighbourhood Policy. This tips the balance towards favouring enlargement — or the promise of enlargement — over other, less assertive options.

<b>Croatia</b>	71	73	56	53	58	<b>80</b>	68	70	57	79	<b>52</b>
<b>Kosovo</b>	43	27	38	34	37	37	44	50	<b>55</b>	32	34
<b>Macedonia</b>	67	43	53	44	49	45	53	61	<b>72</b>	50	40
<b>Serbia</b>	<b>68</b>	36	43	39	46	37	50	63	62	45	38
<b>Turkey</b>	42	34	34	34	36	45	43	<b>61</b>	49	27	31
<b>Ukraine</b>	72	41	66	58	69	48	<b>73</b>	63	63	53	43
	<b>BG</b>	<b>CZ</b>	<b>EE</b>	<b>LV</b>	<b>LT</b>	<b>HU</b>	<b>PL</b>	<b>RO</b>	<b>SI</b>	<b>SK</b>	<b>EU27</b>

*Public preferences in new members for neighbors accession, EB 69 data 2008*

Fifth, the New Member States have found their own "niche" in the EU's division of labour. They contribute enlargement and neighbourhood policies by offering their regional expertise and special relations with the neighbours. As small and medium-sized countries, their entire foreign policies revolve around the relations with their neighbours.

Finally, public opinion in the New Member States supports the case for enlargement — as a rule their support rates are above the EU 27 average. Ukraine is favoured by Poles, Serbia are favoured by Bulgaria's citizens, Macedonia and Kosovo by Slovenians, Croatia is the champion for Hungarians and Turkey among Romanians.

### The domestic factor in shaping foreign policies

The enlargement and Neighbourhood policy choices are presented as elicited on the basis of long-term, firmly set "national interests". Although this may hold true and there is relative consensus, in most cases it is domestic politics that take precedence in the decision-making process. The political divides in a country often include and may revolve around a foreign policy issue. Political shifts may well change the level of activity as well as the substance of a policy position.

The most vivid example of domestic policy considerations in the foreign policy of the New Member States is any policy that concerns Russia in one way or another. Then all the historical and political sensitivities come to the fore of the policy debate. As a rule, there is a clear left–right divide, with the left parties espousing a more reconciliatory tone and the centre-right more assertive and proactive.

Economic interests also have a fair amount of influence in the decision-making process. As energy policies are pivotal in the New Member States, the energy policies impact greatly foreign policy choices. There is an assumption that countries with closer energy cooperation with Russia are much less prone to support assertive neighbourhood policies.

Identity politics also greatly influence the decision-making process. Ethnic minority parties try to influence political decisions in favour of their kin country (Russians in the Baltics, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria). Conversely, there may be a nationalist backlash in the opposite direction.

### **The “new” New Member States: the Western Balkans**

The Balkans are a special place for the European Union. The turmoil of the 1990s was essential for giving birth to and shaping EU’s common foreign policy. The region has remained a test case for Europe’s ability to act together and project capacity for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation efforts. Now the Balkans are also the test field for the second wave of acceding post-Communist states after those in Central Europe, the Baltics, Bulgaria and Romania.

The Balkans receive steady attention and support from their immediate neighbours. Slovenia, as the clear Policy Driver (or Killer in the case of Croatia), made the European perspective of the Balkans the centrepiece of its presidency in the first half of 2008. Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania are immediate neighbours but there is also very active interest on behalf of Slovakia and the Czech Republic — which at some point may even grow because of Slovakia’s engagement in the Balkans (with the EU’s High Representative in BiH) and the Czech Republic becoming more active because of its EU presidency in the first half of 2009.

Croatia gets supports from virtually all New Member States. It is not only seen as the most advanced country in the accession process, but does not carry any negative associations as other countries do (e.g. political instability, institutional weakness or criminality). It is widely expected to end negotiations during the Swedish presidency of the EU in the second half of 2009 and join soon after that.

The somewhat unexpected support to the Western Balkans by a host of New Member States further in the north may play a key role.

### **The division line: Kosovo**

The issue of Kosovo proved to be quite controversial among New Member States. When Kosovo declared independence in 2008, there was no “EU consensus” to hide behind. They had to take sides between Serbia and Kosovo, often to choose between their specific position and the need for European and transatlantic unity, between different interpretations of the “inviolability of borders” principle in the modern context. The concerns were further aggravated by the linking of Kosovo’s case to the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space. As the New Member States have also been interested in resolving the frozen conflicts, they were careful to avoid such assertions.

Kosovo has long created divisions and controversies within the EU as a whole. In 1999, after a NATO operation, care of Kosovo was entrusted to the international community and increasingly to the European Union. The EU followed its usual tactic in the Balkans, to put aside the problem and hope that a solution will present itself. After a decade, in 2008, when the issue of Kosovo was “unfrozen”, the EU countries faced tough choices.

One might think that the US, which has been the main proponent of Kosovo’s independence, would have used its clout to shift the New Member States decisions in the desired direction. Though there was no direct US pressure to do so, Washington’s stance was taken very seriously in the capitals of the New Member States, but other concerns trumped this factor and even the very pro-Atlantic President Basescu of Romania has been very much against the recognition of Kosovo.

Estonia has been a firm supporter of Kosovo, and recognised quickly. Hungary and Bulgaria have been apprehensive of harming their good relations with immediate neighbour Serbia. They did finally recognise Kosovo, as in the case of Bulgaria the regional stability consideration (fear of instability spill-over to Macedonia) and need for Western solidarity trumped other considerations.

Romania and Slovakia, because of domestic political and foreign policy reasons, oppose the recognition of Kosovo to this day. Both countries had concerns of spill-over effects vis-à-vis their minorities as well as concerns about harming relations with their traditional ally Serbia. Their reservations are deeply entrenched and are unlikely to be changed any time soon, but this may be contradicted in the longer term when Kosovo begins to seek accession into the EU.

Despite the differences, none of the countries opposed or questioned the EU's role in Kosovo. On the contrary, they supported greater EU involvement as the only way to help stabilise Kosovo.

### A tall order: deciding on Turkey's accession

The New Member States in general show a high level of solidarity for the candidates and potential candidates. There is also the paradox of requesting fast accession of current candidates to open the way for another round of enlargement. One might also suspect the US support to Turkey's bid might find fertile ground in the pro-Atlantic new members. But none of these arguments applies in the case of Turkey. While there are countries that indeed favour quick membership for Turkey, many of them are ambivalent towards short and medium-term membership prospects or even deliberate open-ended negotiations.

There are at two problems with these attitudes. First, Turkey has repeated over and over again that its goal is membership and other options are not even on the table for deliberation. The second problem is that Turkey feels hurt by the fast track membership of the post-Communist states, while a country that has long been part of the West as a NATO member was sidelined in the EU accession process. Even worse, Turkey considers the chastising of its democracy deficits or other shortcomings by former Soviet satellites as adding insult to injury (as Suat Kiniklioglu argued years ago).

Estonia's government is arguably the most supportive to Turkey's membership, followed by Romania and Hungary. Latvia and the Czech Republic can also be considered supporters above the average level. But even these countries do not describe themselves as "drivers" for Turkey's membership and would not actively oppose a blockade on negotiations. Romania's position is even more situational, as it relates Turkish membership to the prospects of building the Nabucco gas pipeline (which Turkey threatens to torpedo if negotiations derail).

<b>Fast and full Membership</b>	Estonia		
<b>Membership</b>	Romania Hungary	Latvia Czech Republic	Slovenia
<b>Membership in the longer term or with discreet limitations</b>		Lithuania Poland	Bulgaria Slovakia
<b>Open-ended/ Strategic Partnership</b>	No new EU member officially subscribes to this option.		
<b>Turkey's membership</b>	<b>Fast negotiations</b>	<b>Negotiations</b>	<b>Scrupulous negotiations</b>


Slovenia, Slovakia and Bulgaria have a midway position, supporting negotiations and the desired goal of membership. But both Bulgaria and Slovakia have indicated they might support a more scrupulous negotiation process. The Slovak parliament has previously angered Turkey by recognising the Armenian genocide in 2004.

Slovakia has also supported the blockade on negotiations because of the row over the Ankara protocol, when Turkey in practice denied recognition of Cyprus, already an EU Member State. Bulgaria's case is different and ambivalence is prevailing. It has never said yes or no to Turkey's bid. Bulgaria is a direct neighbour of Turkey and they are major partners. Turkish influence

on the economy as well as in politics through the Turkish minority party pushes Bulgaria into the "yes" camp. But historic sensitivities and current concerns about potential Turkish domination among Bulgaria's political elite and population are pulling it in the

other direction. At the end of the day, depending more on domestic political developments rather than on other considerations, Bulgaria is prone to supporting a longer and more scrupulous negotiation process.

EU debates often link Turkey and Ukraine in possible membership scenarios — weighing preferences for their similar strategic importance and size. Both Lithuania and Poland have placed support to Turkey in the context of Ukraine's possible membership. While they have an overall positive attitude to Turkey's membership, their preference for Kiev might impede Ankara if a choice had to be made, as Vilnius and Warsaw state that delays in Turkish negotiations should not infringe on Ukraine's progress. Poland is also prone to cool down its support for Turkey or even hold up the process for at least two reasons. Poland increasingly realises, first, that Turkey's size might drain the EU budget from the New Member States and second, that the sheer voting power of Turkey might create complications for Poland itself.



Of the New Member States, only Lithuania would not reject an open-ended negotiations with Turkey that might end up in "strategic partnership" or another similar option (privileged partnership or special partnership), but even the stance of official Vilnius is in support to Turkey's negotiation process and membership.

Public opinion in the New Member States seem, generally, to coincide with the political positions. Romania's and Hungary's

high level of support is reflected in majority approval, with Romanians having the least negative opinion. Only Estonia's public fails to follow the politicians' lead and registers higher disapproval levels than support. Bulgaria's public opinion reflects the ambivalence — support and disapproval are in equal measure. On the balance, the New Member State citizens who do not support membership of Turkey currently outweigh those who support it.

### Think big: shaping the Eastern neighbourhood policy

All the New Member States, except Slovenia, are located at the eastern fringes of the European Union and have high stakes in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood policies. Their positions set out three trends outlining large-scale shifts in the design of the EU's policy making.

In the first place, there are the turf battles between the "Southern" and "Eastern" flanks within the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the New Member States are trying to swing attention and resources towards their part of the world. Slovenia is the only country with more substantial interests and participation in the southern, Mediterranean dimension. Second, there is a growing divergence within the "East" camp, projected in the making of specific policies. This is the division between the Black Sea Synergy and the new Eastern Partnership, outlining different visions of how business in the neighbourhood should be conducted.

Third, there is the coupling of enlargement and neighbourhood policies, where several New Member States envisage the next wave of enlargement involving current neighbourhood countries. One of Lithuania's expectations is that the new Eastern Partnership will emulate the intensity and instruments of relations between the EU and the Western Balkans. As the Eastern dimension of Neighbourhood Policy will transform into an enlargement policy, it is expected that a membership perspective will be provided to Eastern neighbours even in the short term (Latvia wants this enshrined in the enhanced cooperation agreement).

### **Tipping the balance of the policy frameworks: Partnership vs. Synergy**

The Eastern Partnership, previously known as the Polish–Swedish initiative (after the main authors), is currently the dominant policy towards the Eastern neighbours. It illustrates a substantial shift in the approach of the EU, with a more genuine focus and engagement. More importantly, it is well received by the neighbourhood countries, which view it as a fresh departure from the previous patchy and indecisive neighbourhood approach. The Eastern Partnership puts the so-called Black Sea Synergy announced in April 2007 in the backseat. Unlike the Synergy, the partnership does not include the regional superpowers of Russia and Turkey, but focuses on furthering relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus when the relations normalise enough. According to some, this is a setback, but to most of the new members and the neighbourhood countries this is an asset as it removes the great powers' play and influence to open the way for equal treatment and partnership. In a way, through the Eastern Partnership, the ENP is returning to its roots by focusing only on countries within the neighbourhood: both Russia and Turkey have their own special level of relations with the EU, and scoff at being treated on par with the Eastern neighbours.

In February 2009, the EC issued a reconciliatory statement that the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy should be developed in parallel, but it was more of a gesture — mostly towards Bulgaria, which still insists that investing in the Black Sea Synergy is worth doing. The real reconciliation between the two policies is that the Eastern Partnership is the “real thing”, while the Synergy retains the character of a more low key, technical cooperation.

The good news for the neighbours is that as Sweden will take over from the Czech Republic in the 2009 rotating presidency, the EU will be on the same page for a whole year before moving back to the Mediterranean with the Spanish presidency in the first half of 2010.

### **Partner Preferences in the Eastern neighbourhood**

Ukraine and Georgia are the preferred partners within the Neighbourhood Policy, and it is due as to the geopolitical or other significance attached to these states as well as to the reciprocal aspiration and commitment of those states for closer ties with the EU. They have invested more efforts in reforms and cultivating relations with the EU partners.

Ukraine is undoubtedly a pivotal state in the East and, as Brzezinski claimed in his *Grand Chessboard*, the country is essential for overall European stability. All New Member States support enhanced cooperation with Kiev and the staunchest advocates of Ukraine see the special approach within the Neighbourhood Policy as only a precursor and preparation for the “real thing” — EU membership.

Georgia receives a very high level of solidarity and support — especially after the August War of 2008, which dismembered the country and shattered its society, with political, developmental and post-conflict reconstruction assistance flowing into the country. Georgia is not envisioned in a membership prospect soon, as it is in a quite different geopolitical and security context and farther away from the EU borders.

Moldova also receives a high level of support and not only from “kinship”-related Romania, but also from other countries — more assertively by the Baltics. There is currently a change of course towards Belarus, trying to engage and not isolate Lukashenko's regime. The “Policy Drivers” among the New Member States are at the helm of this charm offensive. The other South Caucasus republics — Armenia and Azerbaijan — also have very good friends and are encouraged to join, despite the fact that they have not yet made up their minds on their strategic orientation.

### **Meet the Policy Drivers in the Eastern neighbourhood**

Poland and the three Baltic republics are probably the staunchest supporters of the neighbourhood countries and the Polish–Swedish initiative is a vivid testimony to that. Slovakia and the Czech Republic follow suit very closely and Romania, through its interest in Moldova, joins the group too. Lithuania overtly supports the future transformation of the ENP into an enlargement policy per se. In fact, all these countries favour elements from enlargement mechanisms applied in the neighbourhood policies so that they may serve as a preparation for membership negotiations. The Czech

Republic will use its presidency of the EU to officially launch the Eastern Partnership and organise accompanying activities intended to push substance into the formal events. Romania, too, has been very active as an engine for Black Sea cooperation but has so far contained its interest mostly to helping out Moldova.

The New Member States see closer relations with the neighbours as a long-term investment. This means that they are not deterred by lack of reciprocity — as in the case of Romania’s enthusiasm despite the cold shoulder (which actually escalated to a cold war in the spring of 2009) from Moldova’s President Voronin, the political turmoil in

<b>POLICY</b>	<b>Membership perspectives for neighbours</b>		Poland Lithuania Latvia Romania
	<b>Eastern Partnership</b>		Poland (super driver) Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Romania Slovakia
	<b>Black Sea Synergy</b>	Poland Lithuania Slovakia	Bulgaria Romania
		<b>Policy Killer</b>	<b>Policy Drivers</b>
<b>Position</b>			

Ukraine, or the often harsh critiques from Georgian President Saakashvili for the failures of the EU to respond adequately to his calls for help. The EU has even decided it’s better to co-opt authoritarian Lukashenko than to isolate his regime.

Bulgaria and Hungary are shying away from the general zeal for assertive neighbourhood policies. Still, Hungary shows preferences for Ukraine as a direct neighbour and for Moldova, which is considered close

enough to the EU (with possible long-term membership options). Bulgaria has found a niche in the Black Sea cooperation and previously enjoyed closer relations with the South Caucasus countries. Now it wants to breathe new life into the Black Sea Synergy.

**The EU “army”: a minimalist approach**

While the New Member States never tire of supporting a “one voice” European Union with a stronger role in the world, their enthusiasm for an “armed wing” of EU’s foreign policy seems to be fading away. There may to be at least three fairly good reasons for this. For the sake of the New Member States, however, none of them seems to contradict in principle their otherwise high level of trust in the EU as such.

Probably the most outstanding factor is the competition between NATO and EU as “military powers”, and NATO seems to be winning. All New Member States at some point say that “there should be no competition between NATO and the fledging EU defence capabilities”. But there is certainly “NATO first” thinking in the New Member States. The reasons for making this choice are more complex than the proverbial pro-Atlantic vs. pro-European loyalties as a hanging shadow of Mr. Rumsfeld’s New Europe.

A group of New Member States — Poland and the three Baltic states — take security very seriously. They do think that (a) for the time being only NATO has the capability to protect them and (b) the transatlantic link (that is, the US presence) is indispensable. These countries also seem to look down on EU’s defence capabilities — as Estonia does — as too dependent on Russia (for strategic lift), which would automatically exclude useful application of the “defence instrument” in regions where Russia would oppose it.

79	85	86	85	85	79	84	79	87	86	76
<b>BG</b>	<b>CZ</b>	<b>EE</b>	<b>LV</b>	<b>LT</b>	<b>HU</b>	<b>PL</b>	<b>RO</b>	<b>SI</b>	<b>SK</b>	<b>EU27</b>

*Common defence and security policy: level of public support, EB 69 data, 2008*

Third, the New Member States have very limited military capabilities and even current commitments (whether within NATO, or

within the EU, or on bilateral bases) overstretch their forces. They do not see a good reason for further duplication of resources. In fact, this is also the case with far richer and bigger EU members.

The fourth reason is that the EU as such has dragged its feet in shaping the defence policy and does not have much to offer. A fourth, though less exposed reason is that while the ESDP is driven by the big Member States in some form of enhanced

cooperation, the small New Member States will feel pushed aside and reluctant to cooperate.

This ambivalence does not mean that the New Member States are hostile to the security and defence policy. They take part in the ESDP missions and battle groups. Poland is the only new member to be part of the Eurocorps, with a pledge also from Romania.

The "EU army" gathers support from even unexpected sources as Bulgaria's nationalist Ataka party (otherwise Eurosceptic), which chastised the EU for failing to develop a robust defence policy.

The chances for a New Member State to "kill" an ESDP initiative are slim. It is not excluded if some ESDP proposal is seen as disrupting the NATO link (e.g. as suggested in Latvia's case). But provided that even France, which has been the main ESDP proponent, has fully returned to NATO, the North Atlantic alliance is unlikely to be challenged any time soon.

### **We'll always have D.C.: the new members and the transatlantic link**

There is no "New Europe" in the sense that Donald Rumsfeld branded it — the New Member States do not provide blindfolded support to everything the US does. In fact, this report argues that if the New Member States of the EU can be defined as a "group", there are more markers to delineate the than the simple division of "Eurocentrist" vs. "Atlanticist" stances. And the "groups" of course come in diverse configurations depending on the markers.

Since the start of the EU accession process, Brussels became the focal point of the CEE. And the deeper the new members were engulfed in EU affairs, the less intense the relations with Washington seemed. But despite the relative decrease in the intensity of relations, the New Member States retain an extremely strong transatlantic link. Washington is an important factor and partner for them and this is not likely to change soon.

There are two factors at work here. The first one was that the new members — former Communist countries — have always seen the "West" mostly as a bloc. European-American rows made them uneasy, and they have always tried to avoid a choice between Europe and America. Moreover, for them, "NATO" (under US lead) and "EU" accession were coupled as *the* inseparable twin projects of their transition paradigm. NATO's accession was faster and it first initiated the former Communist states back into the "West".

The second factor is that the New Member States have made up their minds on the "division of responsibilities". The US has a limited but decisive role. The US — both through NATO and on a bilateral basis — is the primary partner or the key factor in defence, security, and often in foreign and energy policies. The central European states, including the three Baltic states, Poland and Romania explicitly view the United States as their security guarantor. The US has bases (officially dubbed "joint military installations") in Bulgaria and Romania under special defence cooperation agreements. The plans for the missile defence shield elements in Poland and the Czech Republic may not soon materialize, but the underlying policy is for deeper engagement. In the foreign policy domain, US policy has been crucial exactly in the areas of foreign policy interest of the New Member States — the Balkans, the Black Sea area, the rest of the Eastern neighbours, and Russia.

There are certainly oscillations in the political and public attitudes towards the US, juxtaposing "Eurocentrist vs. Atlanticist" political camps. And as things cannot be that simple, there is often the too-complex "Russia" factor as a third party in the equation.

But by and large, this part of Europe is quite "Atlanticist". And though most of the new members would be more in the "Policy Taker" than "Driver" category, they will continue to insist on a strong transatlantic link between the EU and the US, avoiding the double-bind question, "who do you like more?" To borrow from Robert Kagan's claim, the new members find it exhausting to commute the long distance between "Venus" and "Mars".

## On the other side of the fence: policies in the area of freedom, security and justice

### Ranking priorities and measuring activity

The New Member States have three sets of policies within the freedom, justice and security domain. The highest priority is given to protection of external borders and the Schengen agreements. The second priority set is the cooperation on EU level in the fight against organised and transborder crime. The third area concerns asylum and migration policies.

The new members seem to be relatively passive on freedom, security and justice policies. They are mostly "Policy Takers" in the classification of this report, with the notable exception of the Czech Republic. Prague, more often than not, has been quite inquisitive about proposals in the area and is a likely "Policy Killer".

There may be an explanation for this overall "Policy Taker" approach in that the new members do not have high stakes in many of these issues, e.g. the asylum or migration issues. But the more plausible explanation may be about the character of these policies. They involve quite complex, transborder issues that often demand an EU-wide response and intricate legal issues. The new members were also especially hard pressed during the accession period on policies within Justice and Home Affairs. The pressure continued to fulfil stringent requirements for entering the Schengen zone — and the demands are here to stay. In fulfilling these requirements (i.e. external border protection, visa related policies) the new member cannot do without special assistance from the EU as a whole. The combination of the complexity of issues, the need for extra EU assistance and the extraordinary level of

<b>Common immigration policy</b>		All new members, may be potential policy killers	
<b>Common asylum policy</b>		All new members, may be potential policy killers	
<b>Frontex</b>	Czech Republic, may be "policy killer" in some aspects		All the rest of the new members
<b>Eurosur</b>	Hungary, Slovakia	Czech Republic	All the rest of the new members
<b>Simplification of visa regimes and border crossing for neighbors</b>			All new members
<b>Cooperation of law enforcement agencies; Europol enhanced role; Eurojust</b>	Czech Republic, may be "policy killer" in some aspects		All the rest of the new members
<b>Issue or policy/ Positions</b>	<b>Skeptical support or policy killer</b>	<b>Supportive, but not active</b>	<b>Very supportive or policy driver</b>

demand have resulted in the new members being more compliant with the common European solutions (i.e. "Policy Takers").

### What else matters?

The freedom, security and justice policies are perceived by the new members primarily in security terms — as border protection, fighting organised crime, illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking take precedence.

But they are well connected and employed in other policy areas. Visa regimes and border crossings may be leverages in foreign policy for regulating relations and serve either as incentives for reform (Western Balkans and the Eastern neighbourhood countries) or as punishment (the Lukashenko regime in Belarus).

These policies are also increasingly used to regulate inflowing migration, i.e. through national "Green Card" policies or "mobility partnerships" to attract skilled migrants.

### It's also a matter of trust

The policies within the area of freedom, security and justice may be quite sensitive as they affect such closely guarded domains as the national legislative systems or intelligence and law enforcement. Thus, policies in this area also require, among other

things, an exceptional level of trust among EU Member States. And all new members have been under extreme pressure by West Europeans to deliver. Fighting illegal migration, transborder and organised crime needs a coordinated EU-wide or regional approach, and also involves a high level of confidence among partners. In order to lift internal barriers — to the extent Schengen does — the states in the interior have to trust that the countries on the external borders are doing their job properly. Eight of the New Member States just recently joined the Schengen zone as full members: once part of an inner club within the EU, they are intent first of all on fulfilling the expectations of their Western counterparts as reliable partners. Bulgaria and Romania work hard to meet Schengen's daunting criteria.

### Security and solidarity dilemmas: Schengen and the external borders

The New Member States have two priorities within the Schengen and external borders protection policies. But the priorities may be conflicting with each other and the new members are tightly pressed to keep a balance between often diverging commitments and interests. This tension is a result of the obligations they have within the EU's JHA policies and their foreign policy interests for good neighbourly relations.	
<b>Are you concerned about control of the EU's external borders? Flash EB 252, January 2009/YES</b>	
EU 27	80
Hungary	64
Czech Republic	58
Bulgaria	52
Lithuania	52
Estonia	46
Latvia	44
Slovenia	44
Romania	43
Poland	41
Slovakia	39

As the new members are all at the periphery of the EU, their first priority is to make the EU borders safe and impenetrable. But at the same time, they all want a more favourable visa and facilitated border-crossing regime with their non-EU neighbours. In the first case, they are under strains to follow their commitment to the EU and fulfil the expectations of their Western counterparts. In the second case, they have a multitude of fairly good reasons for that: practical purposes to facilitate trade and economy; for solidarity reasons, as they were in similar positions not too long ago; and as part of the general support to the neighbours for much closer relations with the EU.

Within the broader EU framework on border protection, the New Member States are seeking a balance between the "Southern dimension" and the "Eastern and Balkan dimension", as the latter concerns directly the New Member States.

### Choosing policy options

All the new members have external EU borders, except for the Czech Republic but which has a stake in these policies too. But the choice of policies depends on the particular challenge the guarding of these borders represents. There are diverse flashpoints: the southern border and the Western Balkans, the north-eastern and eastern borders (with the special case of Kaliningrad), the maritime borders with the Black Sea in the south and the Baltic Sea in the north.

Thus the countries that have longer borders demonstrate more enthusiasm for common measures or measures that will help their national efforts. For example, Hungary, which soon expects to remain with only two short strips of external borders, is more reluctant about costly measures. Landlocked countries are much less inclined to support the new EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System), which will boost the surveillance of the maritime borders.

There is generally very strong support for Frontex — the European border management agency — and the intention to provide it with more powers and funding (the Czech Republic is the sceptic on this issue).

### Asylum and immigration: a showcase and test for solidarity

The New Member States have medium to low concern about migration and even less for asylum issues, as compared to the rest of the EU. The New Member States are supportive to the enveloping asylum policies mostly for solidarity reasons — they understand the concerns of Member States most affected by asylum and migration issues and want to show some team spirit. The New Member States are only marginally affected by these phenomena now, despite expectations that they would themselves turn from a source of migration to countries of destination. But currently they are

**Are you concerned about asylum policy? Flash EB 252, January 2009/YES**

EU 27	54
Latvia	39
Lithuania	38
Bulgaria	36
Czech Republic	36
Slovenia	32
Slovakia	29
Estonia	28
Hungary	24
Poland	22
Romania	22

mostly transit routes for asylum seekers or illegal migrants, travelling to more affluent countries.

Public opinion is not concerned about asylum seekers and asylum policy either. The figures are well below the average EU levels.

But while supportive, the New Member States may turn into "Policy Killers" if proposed measures run against their interests. The support is for more harmonisation, but it stops short there. Their position on the new Pact on Asylum and Migration, offered by the French Presidency in 2008, has indicated high support overall, but also relief that the Pact offers political guidelines for the EU and not mandatory prescriptions for the governments.

A common objection is that imposing a standard treatment of asylum seekers and migrants across the EU may strain the resources of the host countries. Raising minimal standards,

without regard to the socio-economic development of the host states, may result in a better treatment of foreign nationals than of the New Member States' own citizens. In the EU context, this would mean better conditions for third-country nationals than for fellow EU citizens from new members. The frustration comes most of all before the backdrop of the imposed transition periods for the New Member States — with the infamous backlash against the "Polish plumber" — causing a hostile response to the idea of an EU-wide "Blue Card" for third-country nationals that might discriminate against those from new members.

### Deliberating to attract migrants

But the other side of the migration policy coin is that the new members have started to deliberate managed migration to attract skilled migrants into their own countries. The combination of high economic growth and outward migration has left many new members' labour markets depleted. Thus, many New Member States have concentrated on managed migration to attract third-country nationals. The logical choice was to offer opportunities to neighbouring states through the so-called "circular migration" and related "mobility partnerships" and even their own "Green Card" programmes, directed especially at the Eastern neighbourhood countries. There is certainly a practical element in this, attracting quality personnel, but there is also a policy element for furthering relations with close neighbours. The economic crisis might reverse or temporarily halt these measures, but with the mechanisms in place they would be restarted as soon as the economy recovers.

### Fighting transborder and organised crime

**Are you concerned about the fight against organised crime and terrorism? Flash EB 252, January 2009/YES**

Bulgaria	86
EU 27	80
Estonia	80
Lithuania	79
Latvia	77
Slovenia	76
Romania	66
Hungary	64
Slovakia	64
Czech Republic	58
Poland	57

Fighting transborder and organised crime is a high priority for the New Member States, not least because of initial expectations that enlargement would infuse higher crime levels into the EU. As organised crime often has a transborder character, fighting it depends on common and coordinated approaches across the EU.

These demands have translated into greater support to specialised institutions and policies. The New Member States are very supportive of the two organisations, Europol and Eurojust. Europol received a high level of support from the New Member States and it was during the Slovene presidency that Europol was transformed into an EU agency. These attitudes also entail support for legislative measures such as harmonisation of serious aspects of cross-border crime.

They are also enthusiastic about the Prüm convention on "deepening transfrontier cooperation, amongst others in view of combating terrorism, transfrontier crime, and illegal migration". The new members have also been inclined to introduce the QMV and "communitarisation" of the third pillar as a contingency plan to

boost Justice and Home Affairs should the Lisbon Treaty fail.

**Local specifics and contributions**

There are two “local” contributions to the area of freedom, security and justice, which deserve to be registered here, despite that they are of very different character and order.

The first one is the case of Bulgaria and Romania being placed under special Cooperation and Verification Mechanisms after accession, which monitor and assess their progress in judicial reform and fighting corruption and organised crime. The monitoring mechanism is carried out by the EC and there is the possibility of imposing a safeguard clause as a last resort in case of non-delivery.

In another, completely different “contribution” to freedom, security and justice policies, a host of new members (the Baltic countries and the Czech Republic in the lead) want an official recognition that the crimes of the Stalinist and totalitarian regimes can be equated to the gravity of Nazi crimes. They have proposed it as part of the Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia. But the EU as a whole is reluctant to delve into the complex ethical debate, as it sparks domestic and foreign policy issues, involving Russia.

## Visions of Europe: deciding on the institutional issues

A future encyclopaedia entry to the Lisbon Treaty should have the photographs of the Kaczynski brothers and Mr. Václav Klaus next to it. The old Member States — France, the Netherlands and Ireland — may have made a public display in rejecting the EU's institutional progress, but the new members — Poland and the Czech Republic — have put a more personal face to it as their leaders led the offensive first on the Constitutional Treaty and then on the Lisbon Treaty.

However, such vehement opposition is an exception rather than the rule among the New Member States. Like most neophytes, the New Member States want to prove that they are better Europeans than the old Member States by demonstrating more zeal in things European. In fact, most countries rushed to ratify both proposed treaties at record speeds — Hungary did so even before having translated the Lisbon Treaty into the Hungarian language. There have been afterthoughts that the ratification process could have been used as a bargaining tool, for example some voices in Bulgaria and Lithuania wanting to leverage it against reopening nuclear reactors, but that never materialised. The new members avoided referendums as any delay or unwanted results (a rejection would be presumably for domestic reasons) might have tarnished their image as good Europeans. The levels of enthusiasm for the European Union that politicians and the public alike have demonstrated have remained high through the years despite minor fluctuations.

Despite the fact that no country stands out as a particular Policy Driver or Killer (except for Poland and the Czech Republic), institutional issues are undoubtedly of key importance to the new members.

Issue		Preference
<b>President of the European Council</b>	X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Preferably low key and largely symbolic role, so that it does not overshadow the rotating presidencies and impose the will of the big states.</li> <li>▪ As he is considered to be from a big Member State, even Tony Blair may not stand a chance for receiving support.</li> </ul>
<b>Rotating presidency</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Its stature should be retained.</li> </ul>
<b>High Representative</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ More acceptable than the President. Preferably a new member representative should be appointed.</li> <li>▪ The High Representative should hold on to his EC-hat more.</li> </ul>
<b>External Action Service (EAS)</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Although not particularly liked by national administrations as a competitor, the EAS is very welcome as it would multiply the influence and representation of smaller states.</li> <li>▪ Some new members insist on a quota to guarantee greater representation (Hungary does not want it for the same reasons).</li> <li>▪ There should be some sort of regional specialisation, so that the New Member States cover regions/issues of their national interests.</li> <li>▪ The EAS should be on the common budget.</li> </ul>
<b>European Commission</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ One country — one commissioner. Quite happy with the arrangement gained by Ireland during the French Presidency.</li> </ul>
<b>European Parliament</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The more for the new members the better. That is why the Lisbon Treaty is preferred.</li> </ul>
<b>Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Acceptable, as long as it does not apply in areas of special interest to the new members, such as taxation.</li> </ul>
<b>Charter of Fundamental Rights</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Accepted by all, except for Poland, which gained an opt-out, and the Czech Republic with a protocol as a reservation.</li> </ul>
<b>One-speed EU</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Means less enthusiasm for enhanced cooperation projects.</li> </ul>

### What do they really want? Paradoxes of behaviour

The New Member States had three requirements for the Lisbon Treaty:

- The Lisbon Treaty should be ratified by all Member States and in force as soon as possible.
- No re-negotiation or revisions of the Treaty during the ratification should be allowed.
- Given the opportunity, the new members would immediately scrap the Treaty and re-write key provisions.

There is an apparent paradox between the first two and the third claim that demands an explanation.

The reason is that the New Member States strongly support what the Lisbon Treaty stands for, but at the same time they are concerned that some of the novelties in the Treaty would infringe on their interests, and that a hasty revision may bring in other less-beneficial provisions inserted through the backdoor without consultations.

The Lisbon Treaty, as a successor of the Constitutional Treaty, is meant to introduce very serious institutional changes in the EU that will allow it to function more effectively: the institutions will be redesigned for more members, thus providing for further enlargements; the EU role in the world will be consolidated; and hopefully the democratic deficit will also be addressed.

The New Member States are very much in favour of all these — they want a more effective Union, they want to see their role in the world multiplied through the EU common institutions, they want enlargement to continue as this is the centrepiece of their foreign policies. Their understanding is that Lisbon may not be the best, but it is the most feasible course of action in order to allow the EU to progress further after the train crash of the Constitutional Treaty.

A delay in introducing Lisbon will mean less-favourable treatment as provided for under the Nice Treaty, for example, fewer seats at the European Parliament.


A quick ratification would prevent sudden and undesired renegotiation of the Treaty. The current shape of the Treaty was attained after tiresome negotiations and carefully crafted bargains. The new members are quite concerned that a hasty revision will allow bigger and more influential states to introduce undesirable changes.

But at the same time the New Member States remain apprehensive about some of the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty that they think do not best serve their interests.

The outcome of the institutional debates in the European Union can significantly increase or decrease the status of the new members within the EU — either elevated as normal peers or relegated to a second tier position within the institutions and the decision making of the EU. As they are already lagging behind on an array of criteria such as the “European level” of economic and social development, they are careful not to lose levers to advance their agenda.

The President, High Representative and the External Action Service are the first on the watch list as having the potential to discriminate against the new members. While the new members accept the Treaty as it is, they will seek opportunities to shape these institutions to their liking only after the Treaty has been ratified.

### Double disadvantage: the root of the problem and coalition patters



The New Member States consider that they are at a double disadvantage — once as “new” and then as “small” member states. This anxiety may explain their preferences and strategies in shaping the institutional setup of the EU. Poland is an exception with a fulsome 29 votes in the Council, 50 MEPs and a place in the “G6” — the group of the biggest EU members. But even Poland, which is in a league of its own, shares many of the new members’ interests.

<b><i>Are the interests of your country well respected in the EU? EB69, 2008</i></b>	
Slovakia	57
Slovenia	56
EU 27	46
Estonia	46
Poland	44
Lithuania	40
Romania	40
Hungary	37
Czech Republic	36
Bulgaria	32
Latvia	22

The new members' concern is that the big Member States may easily use their clout — by outvoting or cutting separate deals — to undermine the interests of the small Member States. In a similar vein they think that as new members they are underrepresented in the common institutions and do not have the same institutional knowledge and capacity for influence.

Public opinion supports the argument of the New Member States feeling small and in relative deprivation. Except for Slovakia and Slovenia, the citizens of the other countries consider that the interests of their states are not well respected in the EU.

Those two concerns help shape coalitions patterns along two sides of the barricade: "new" vs. "old" and "small/medium" vs. "big" countries.

### **Damage control: the power of the institutional and national interest**

The perceived double disadvantage results in the new members designing strategies to control the possible damages and maximise the benefits of the Lisbon Treaty. This translates into two inter-related strategies — balancing between the intergovernmental and supranational approaches in the EU, and seeking to influence the functioning of a position or an agency. This influence can be both in the form of fiddling the "job descriptions" of the new positions in the EU and having a say over the appointments of a concrete person. They hardly hope to prevail, but want to set sort of system of checks and balances in place to avoid total domination.

For example, the High Representative, while serving as the "one voice" of the EU, should ideally reflect the positions of all member states. But the new members would prefer the High Representative to be more "EC-centric" — i.e. sticking closer to the role as Vice-President of the Commission. This would presumably move him/her away from any particular Member State position and closer to a common ground position. Thus, the concern of being sidelined by the bigger and more influential states drives the New Member States into embracing the Commission as their ally as it represents "higher", common European interest as opposed to the narrow national interests. In fact, a recent case in point was the row over protectionist measures touted by President Sarkozy, where new members looked upon the Commission as guardian of the internal market freedoms.

Regarding the specific appointment, existing opinion is that the President would certainly come from a big Member State, but a representative of a New Member State may have a chance as a High Representative. As registered in the country reports, even Tony Blair, otherwise highly popular among the new members, would not have a chance for their support.

But the support for the Commission and the supranational principle is used only selectively as the new members are definitely not comfortable with the provisions that will diminish the role of the Member States. While considering the new positions of President of the EU and High Representative essential, the new members are concerned that these new positions may literally steal the show from the rotating presidencies.

For many of the small countries this will not only deprive them of opportunities to promote their policy agenda but will also take away a valuable prestige opportunity — their 15 minutes of glory on the international and domestic scene. The future President of the European Council is a particularly controversial position. According to the new members it would endanger both their rotating presidencies and serve mostly as the voice of the big Member States. The preferred solution: the position should be low-profile and with limited competencies. Even Poland, which is in the big states club, has been concerned about the future President of the Council, especially when Poland's Presidency of the EU is nearing in 2011 and it worries that there is too little time to clearly divide roles between the permanent and rotating presidencies.

The functioning of the External Action Service (EAS) is supported by all new members and is probably the least questioned innovation. The reasoning is that it will help the

small and new to multiply their diplomatic representation and international weight. But it too brings a bone of contention. As the EAS is a “common property” between the Member States and the EU institutions, the new members insist on greater representation of the Member States. Some of them would like to see an official or unofficial quota (Hungary does not want it as it thinks it can fill more positions than provided by a quota) as well as appointments that correspond to their foreign policy interests. But the EAS should be covered fully by the EU budget.

Representation in the European Commission is seen as another opportunity for prestige and advancing the agenda of the Member States. Despite the fact that the commissioners are considered supra-national and in practice may have poor relations with their national governments for political or other reasons, the Member States still like to think of them as representatives of their countries and defenders of their interests within the EC. The New Member States accepted, but were never happy with, the initial Lisbon Treaty arrangements that decreased the number of commissioners.

“One country — one commissioner” is the preferred formula, now back in circulation after the December 2008 bargain with Ireland over accepting the Lisbon Treaty. But the relative weight of the portfolio also matters, demonstrated by Romania’s stance with just a “multi-linguist” commissioner and its vows to gain the “agriculture seat” in the 2009 Commission.

“One-speed Europe” only is the other major preference as the New Member States are all alarmed by any hints at “multi-speed” Europe. This may translate into less support for or even discouragement of any attempts at enhanced cooperation projects. They feel that such projects may exclude them because of their weaker capacity, and they themselves would hardly start such an enterprise.

### **Bringing down the house: the Polish and Czech cases**

Poland and the Czech Republic have made a name for themselves through their unruly behaviour towards the EU’s institutional development plans. Warsaw has been more assertive as because of its sheer weight as well as because domestic political developments combined the influence of the President and the Prime Minister (the brothers Kaczynski) amid weak opposition. Prague has mainly President Klaus and the Eurosceptic wing of the ruling Civic Democratic Party of Prime Minister Topolánek.

In contrast to smaller new members, Poland is less anxious that the new positions in the EU might overshadow Warsaw’s stature. With 27 votes in the Council — next to the 29 of Germany, France, UK and Italy, and equal to Spain’s 27 — and with Polish names being thrown into debates on new high level appointments, it really feels comfortable that it will not be pushed aside.


Even as it took time and efforts to convince Poland that the Lisbon Treaty should be based on the Constitution, Poland announced the red lines that it would not cross. First, there is the opt-out from the Charter on Fundamental Rights, thus joining the UK as the only two countries to avoid the charter. In fact, besides joining an exceptional group of opt-outs such as the UK, Denmark and Ireland, the victory is also notable for the CEE crowd as they were not allowed opt-out options at all during the accession negotiations. Then Poland defied the double majority rule, delaying it until 2014 with a clause that would practically enforce it no earlier than 2017. Poland also managed to introduce a provision in the Lisbon Treaty (the so-called Ioannina clause in a protocol to the Treaty) that would allow Member States to delay decisions of the Council taken by qualified majority voting, although the decisions are de facto taken and not blocked.

As a matter of fact, Poland’s MEPs have even defied the European Parliament rules by setting up the “Klub Polski”, uniting the Polish MEPs. The usual European ways are that the Members of the European Parliament function along party and ideological lines, not national ones, which is reflected even in the formation of groups.

President Klaus, who dislikes the EU and likes to show it, has been a major troublemaker for the Lisbon Treaty too. The Czech critiques are targeted at principles such as sovereignty pooling and public legitimacy of the Treaty as well as concrete institutional proposals. The Czech Republic managed to score several victories, among which Prague’s own innovation was the “either way flexibility or bidirectional competences transfer”. The proposal allows for transferring competences back from the community level to the Member States and was ultimately included as part of Declaration 18 to the Treaty. The Czechs also defied the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and despite not

getting an opt-out like the Poles, managed to include their declaration on the Charter, implying they can backpedal on the Charter provisions if they consider it necessary. Prague, like many other new members, was concerned about the QMV rule in taxation, but it was ultimately resolved to their benefit.

And while most of the new members rushed to ratify the Lisbon Treaty, the Czech Republic, driven by President Klaus, has not done so to this day. Even if the shaky government in Prague manages to ratify the Treaty in parliament, the President declared he will not sign it until Ireland backs it in a referendum, thus making the Czech Republic the last in line.



### The new members: troublemakers or defenders of the faith

Despite the wariness of the New Member States of possible “dictates” by the big and old members, this does not lower their enthusiasm for the EU or their visions for a deeper Union, as the new members subscribe for a stronger, more consolidated Europe. The New Member States uphold policies that espouse a more “federalist” thinking. Their citizens often trust Brussels more than the governments in their national capitals.

Translated into concrete policy solutions, the EU would have a “one voice” policy, especially in foreign policy matters, elevating the weight of the EU on the international scene. Hence the support to solutions as the High Commissioner for Foreign and Security Policy, who will combine the roles of the current High Commissioner (Mr. Solana) and the Commissioner for External Relations (Ms. Ferrero-Waldner), as well as the External Action Service (as the “foreign ministry” for the EU).

The frustration of having less impact on the EU’s decision-making process never takes on the form of a considerable backlash. In fact, public opinion, despite feeling their country’s interests are not well respected, registers very high levels of trust in the European Union. This is a solid base of legitimacy for the new members, which want “more of the EU”. At the end of the day, the new members are striving to be good Europeans, trying to bring balance to the system.

## Reality check

The previous sections revolved more around the assertion “what the new members can do for the EU, not asking what the EU can do for them”. So there is a need to cross the two perspectives, pitting more sharply the policy plans of the New Member States against the reality on the ground — the predominant trends, preferences, factors shaping policy decisions as within the EU as well as in the wider policy context.

- In the **Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs and internal market**, the New Member States have scored a victory on rejecting taxation thanks to the UK’s own position and massive interventions. There have been partial successes in removing the transition period on workers mobility due to the good will of fellow Member States. The advocacy efforts to do with all the transition periods amounted to failure and had to be scaled back. The new members have willingly supported (mostly as “Policy Takers”) other measures in the package. Some of them are lobbying to get a short cut to joining the Euro, but this is a bridge too far as the Euro zone members and the ECB are reluctant to change the rules.
- **Minority integration** issues, except for a few countries, are perceived as strictly internal matters for which the EU has only indirect and supportive functions. Only Hungary and Romania pursue change at EU level. The others are not convinced this is the best course of action and the major players have turned out to be non-governmental organisations.
- In the **energy and climate** area, the new members, led by Poland, have managed to win big on greenhouse gas emissions. Several of them have joined a powerful coalition (with France and Germany) to fight back the unbundling rule of the 3<sup>rd</sup> liberalisation package, which had brought the current compromise solutions. They, like the rest of the European Union, have remained divided over practical measures to guarantee energy security and common external energy policy. They have remained divided, but not opposed, over whether other policies — such as regulators’ cooperation — should be implemented. The big questions of a common European policy are still works in progress; for example, a major international summit coming in December 2009 in Copenhagen will pave the way towards a post-Kyoto arrangement.
- In the **Common Agriculture Policy**, the New Member States are on friendly ground, as they did not want a revolution but smaller improvements. As the reform is yet to be elaborated and put into practice, it is likely that they will score partial successes and partial losses in the bargaining process.
- The **enlargement and neighbourhood** options are a tough call. Currently the situation on the ground looks bleak, and the members’ more enthusiastic statements look misplaced. When talking about reality on the ground it means in Brussels and EU capitals as well as in the candidate and Eastern neighbourhood countries. The two candidates’ negotiations (Croatia and Turkey) have stalled; Macedonia has candidate status for four years now, but no date for negotiations. The rest of the Western Balkans are still on the “potential candidate” list. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have serious political stability or sovereignty issues. In Brussels and the major capitals, there are serious apprehensions about enlargement and neighbourhood, reflected in the pretext on halted institutional reform of the EU (“absorption or integration” capacity) as well as genuine concern over meddling in the hot spots in the East.
- **Freedom, security and justice** is where the majority of New Member States seem to be most willing to follow the lead of the rest and prove to the Western partners that they are reliable. Schengen, safeguarding the external borders, and related policies are the most important issues. As the New Member States are all at the external borders and need the EU’s approach, help and solidarity, they are more inclined to stick to communitarised approaches. Asylum and illegal migration are of much less concern to them than to countries of destination and the EU Mediterranean

countries, but they support common policies as long as this would not burden their budgets or create better conditions for migrants and asylum seekers than for their own citizens.

- **Institutional issues** is an area where most of the New Member States are “crypto-dissidents”. The Czech Presidency, which was expected to be a role model in many respects for the performance of the New Member States, fell victim to domestic politics. And this varying success level actually made the case for a stronger president of the EU and minimising the role of rotating presidency. Reportedly, Tony Blair is again on the shortlist as the first president of the EU, to lead it with decisive hand, paradoxically thanks to Czech President Klaus, who in fact sought just the opposite effect.

## Wrapping up and looking ahead: three scenarios for the future

There are three scenarios in this chapter. The first, **“business as usual”** is actually a **“baseline” scenario**, summing up findings and projecting developments primarily on the basis of the research in this study. As there is a strong institutional routine in EU decision making, developments within this scenario will certainly take place even if some parameters undergo change.

Then there are two **“Great Recession” crisis scenarios**, which take the liberty to move the vantage point higher and farther, even with the risk of losing some details along the way. Both these scenarios take as a point of departure the global crisis beyond its immediate economic effects. The crisis is perceived as a “make or break” event for the EU as seen from a New Member State perspective. These projections are not based on the research methodology and were not planned initially. But as the new members are increasingly and more deeply affected by the crisis, their role as “agenda setters” in the EU will be influenced too. Hence, both crisis scenarios were outlined to offer food for thought and invite further discussion.

The first scenario is dubbed **“De-EU-isation”**, claiming that the new members’ agenda will drift apart from the EU. This is a doomsday scenario, but still possible. The second crisis scenario is more optimistic, but most of all it is a prescriptive scenario that recommends **“A ‘New Deal’ for the EU”**.

### **“Business as usual”: the baseline scenario**

#### **Five assertions about the dynamics of new members’ policy positions**

This scenario is based on already-identified positions and projections about probable behaviour of the New Member States. It focuses on their preferences of priority areas and expected dynamics in the short and medium term:

- The Member States have proven to be agenda setters in the European Union in their own right. While they have capacity deficiencies and limited weight in EU decision making, a policy proposal, a veto or the critical mass of a coalition may significantly tip the balance of an EU policy.
- The new members have currently concentrated their efforts in four policy areas: energy and climate, CAP and budget, internal market and Lisbon Strategy, and foreign policy — with a decent share of activity as Policy Drivers or Killers as opposed to a more passive position as Policy Takers;
- In the short and medium term, the new members’ portfolio of interest will stay similar: energy and climate, CAP and budget, internal market and Lisbon Strategy, and foreign policy; freedom security and justice and institutional issues will rank high as more concrete solutions should be identified within these two areas.
- The future promises more dynamic developments as the intensity of activity may grow considerably in the near future in all seven policy areas. This will include significant increases in freedom, security and justice and institutional issues. In the energy and climate policy area, which is anyway the champion among new members, the level of activity will exceed the more passive “Policy Taker” attitude. This is based most of all on the fact that the EU will be taking important decisions soon in these areas and the new members will have to make choices.
- A lower level of activity may not necessarily mean a lower level of interest —institutional development garners a lot of attention but fewer things are considered targets for change (it is an area of “crypto”-Killers and Drivers, which are dormant now but will become active once the bargaining on appointments and job descriptions for the EU’s new positions and structures starts). But Member States remain reluctant to promote minority integration, despite its importance, to the level of EU policy.

On the balance, the New Member States have been more in the “Policy Taker” category, than “Policy Killers” or “Policy Drivers”. The reasons may vary from country to country and from issue to issue. Part of the explanation is the “jetlag” syndrome and the

shortage of capacity. But it is often the case that the countries either lack stakes or do not believe they can make a difference by their position. There may be a need to strongly re-connect the EU agenda with national public and political agendas. This would be a two-way process of more assertiveness on behalf of the new members and more responsiveness from the EU.

## **Two “Great Recession” crisis scenarios for the new members and the EU**

### **The global crisis as a make-or-break event**

The global economic crisis is shattering current realities, transforming the world order and shaping new global governance. Its critical impact on the EU unfolds by the moment, posing two critical questions:

- (a) how the Union will get through this; and
- (b) what the EU will be like when the crisis is over.

The crisis-effect scenarios are based on the premise that the new members will be affected as a group. The international press, institutions and pundits have resurrected the concept of “Eastern Europe” in the context of the crisis. The re-branding has sometimes been used indiscriminately to include countries from Slovenia and Estonia as far as Ukraine or even Turkey. This was often to the dismay of the new EU members, which has sought for 20 years to overcome associations with the former Eastern Communist bloc.

The new members may differ from each other and they are even more different from the non-EU members. But despite specifics, the crisis demonstrated clearly that by and large the members do currently represent a group with shared characteristics, problems and interests — demonstrated at least by the 1 March 2009 pre-pre summit of nine New Member States, when they gathered at the Polish embassy in Brussels to help forge a common line on the EU’s anti-crisis response.

### **“De-EU-isation”: a doomsday crisis scenario**

#### **The bottom-line of the “De-EU-isation” scenario**

Under this scenario, the New Member States’ agenda will be drifting away from the common policies and institutions of the EU. The scenario will be triggered by growing disappointment about EU’s hapless response to their economic troubles. As the crisis brings most dire social and political consequences to these countries, the dissent will have a large area-effect.

If the new members continuously find themselves turned away, they will resort to policy and institutional solutions outside of the EU. Surely, they will not turn their backs on Brussels completely, but will restrict participation to a select set of policies — a first-aid kit — that apply strictly to their survival in the turmoil. The areas of interest will be limited to keeping the single market, making sure the CAP cash keeps flowing, etc. — that is, only the basics and some fringe benefits if possible. Once in motion, these trends will carry on beyond the current crisis.

This scenario does not imply “de-Europeanisation” of the new members or simply “re-nationalisation” of policies. They will seek to remain European as far as it gets, but the EU will lose legitimacy and will be sidelined — possibly giving way to new patterns of cooperation.

#### **The evidence is piling up**

The basic argument is that the current crisis is a “stress-test” that will show who the real friends are. As Brussels and the ECB stood aloof, the smaller crisis-stricken countries have embraced the lifeline of support offered by the Washington-based IMF.

When World Bank President Robert Zoellick advocated strongly for EU-driven international action to help Eastern Europe, he was given a cold shoulder by the EU. Monetary Affairs Commissioner Joaquín Almunia argued that a single solution for the

region's problems is not appropriate because the countries fall into different categories — some being EU members and other not. But even this argument does not hold completely true as Lithuania (a member) and Serbia (not even a candidate), are receiving basically the same kind of treatment.

The calls for fast entry into the Euro area as the most feasible anti-crisis measure (as implied also by the leaked April 2009 IMF report), have been bluntly rejected. The EU has clearly been reluctant to use available instruments or develop new ones to help the new members in distress.

It is true that Europeans did foot a huge part of the IMF bill. But refusing to channel actions through the EU institutions reinforces the point of EU's weakness. This situation invites an unsavoury analogy to the Bosnia and Kosovo crises, when US-driven NATO did the job instead of the EU, which stood on the sidelines.

### **How will the centre-periphery tension end up?**

The crisis has affected the countries on the periphery much more severely than the affluent countries in the centre of the international economic system, which can basically bail their way out of the crisis — alleviating the economic, social and political consequences.

Applied to the EU context, the New Member States did not find the guarantees they sought from the centre of their universe — Brussels. This depreciates Brussels' value and opens the door to alternative solutions.

It is rather hard to tell what these alternatives would be if the centre-periphery relations are reconfigured.

For starters, there is clearly a stronger transatlantic link. The US was at the forefront of building liberal democracies and market economies in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. As the region drew closer to EU accession, the transatlantic link and sentiments remained but Brussels took precedence. Now the odds are changing once again — US Senator John Kerry made the point, “[w]e can't risk losing 20 years worth of gains in the region” in his article “Eastern Europe Needs Our Help” (Wall Street Journal, 27 February 2007). It was the US-dominated IMF and the World Bank that stepped up to offer encouragement and help.

This scenario might also give birth to new forms of sub-regional solutions — creation of new configurations that might involve “old” members too. One might look to Sweden to care for the Baltics, Italy and especially Austria summoning help for the CEE (the coincidence with historical patterns is telling and worth a separate discussion). Their pleas to the EU have been turned down too, so they may be readily available to join the crowd of reluctant members.

### **De-EU-isation: the verdict**

This scenario should be avoided. Its unwillingness to engage fully and its tendency to outsource troubleshooting to other players may render the EU irrelevant.

The crisis may be economic at its core, but it will inflict severe political damage to the European Union, all but wiping it out as a “grand project”.

This is all the more possible as it was the major players in the EU, who started to look in different directions and retrench to national solutions to the crisis.

## **“A ‘New Deal’ for the EU”: best-case crisis scenario**

### **The bottom-line of the “New Deal” scenario**

Under this scenario, the New Member States will invest heavily in the European Union, but they will actively seek to introduce changes that make the EU responsive to their needs and interests. This will be a reversal of the still residing “asymmetric” attitudes in relations within the EU, which are a legacy of the pre-accession negotiation process.

The ultimate goal will be a “new deal” within the EU that will position the New Member States to capitalise better on EU membership. The trigger of this scenario would be recognition by new members that the EU remains the primary venue to pursue their

interests and, more importantly, that this plan is reciprocated by Brussels and their counterparts in the EU.

The crisis necessitates austerity programmes in every aspect, imposing cuts on “luxury goods”. Extending this comparison, the new members will be way choosier about what they are offered, what they spend and what they will get in return from the EU. The available policy options will be severely scrutinised, which means that new members will be more “Policy Drivers” and “Killers” than “Takers”.

In this scenario, the new members will seek to counterbalance the re-nationalisation of policies that dominate the EU now. As the new members will need the EU more than ever, and will need it in the best shape possible, they will pursue further consolidation and strengthening of the EU. This will entail the baseline scenario described above, under which they render support to the common institutions and policies, including the supra-national European Commission, while seeking a greater role for themselves in the inter-governmental structures.

Despite that the scenario invokes “solidarity” it entails a lot of interest-based reasoning and less sentiment. “EU solidarity” in the harsh context of the economic crisis can be interpreted (to put it bluntly) as a request to surplus countries like Germany to deliver hard, cold cash for bailing out the rest of the EU. In this case, Germany and the other saviours would be saving their export markets.

### **Possible benchmarks for this scenario**

Whether the EU will start using and improving the instruments it has at its disposal to troubleshoot the crisis, instead of outsourcing this function to the external institutions, is the key yardstick for benchmarking this scenario.

The basic conditions for the scenario are an easy guess: (a) the new members and their counterparts should demonstrate some bold vision and leadership and (b) the EU should show responsiveness. As these are easier said than done, and are in general in short supply now, the benchmarks should be operationalised. It is a daunting task, but some may be offered as a food for thought:

A first possible benchmark would be to see the ECB and Euro area members reconfirming their commitment to enlarging the zone by letting into the EMU all those EU countries that want to join. If ECB and Euro area members warm up to enlargement, this would represent a very strong case for further integration of the EU. Failure to do so would send a signal of a disintegration trend.

The second benchmark would be holding the line against protectionism and economic nationalism. This is fair bet, as so far the New Member States have resisted these tendencies with allies such as Germany and the European Commission.

A third benchmark would be scrapping the remaining transition periods for workers from the new members. At this point, this would be more of a goodwill gesture because anyway the migrants from the new members are leaving Western Europe and heading back home. This would be practical when the Western markets rebound and find a need for labour force again. But its substantive meaning is to remove yet another internal barrier between “new” and “old”.

A fourth possible benchmark would be giving a fair deal to new members in the upcoming institutional revamping of the European Union and alleviating fears among the small and new members that the big states will dominate the agenda of the EU. Can there be a “new” President of the European Council?

### **Straighten up and fly right: the verdict on the “New Deal’ for the EU” scenario**

This is the preferable scenario. The immediate results of swift and direct action, as requested by the new members, will alleviate the crisis effects across the board in the EU system. The EU would not only avoid a divide, but it will emerge even more consolidated internally, with more coherent policies. The demonstration of solidarity and commonality of action will invigorate the “European project”.

In the bigger picture, an irrelevant EU will easily lose the global competition of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. A case in point, the “new global governance framework” of the G20 has several EU countries as major members, but the EU itself gave the impression of being an

onlooker. The current scenario will give the EU more weight in its desired role as a legitimate player in the global order that will follow the crisis.

The main risk in this otherwise cheerful scenario is to find the right leaders to spearhead the process — both within the new members group and the EU as a whole.

**About the author**

**Marin Lessenski** is a policy analyst with the European Policies Initiative and expert at the European Policies and Civic Participation Program of the Open Society Institute – Sofia. He has been Director of Programmes of the Institute for Regional and International Studies (IRIS) since 1998. He holds an MA in Southeast European Studies from the Central European University – Budapest and an MA in History from the University of Sofia. He has been a Freedom House Visiting Fellow with the Hudson Institute's Center for European and Eurasian Studies and the Center for National Security Studies. He has also been a participant in the Transatlantic Young Leaders Program of the Aspen Institute – Berlin.

Mr. Lessenski has commented and written on EU's foreign, security, neighbourhood and enlargement policy; democratisation, foreign policy, security and institutional developments in Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region; identity politics and interethnic relations. Contact: [mlessenski@osi.bg](mailto:mlessenski@osi.bg)

## Supplements

### Methodology notes

The research has been carried out by individual researchers in each of the ten new members on the basis of specially designed methodology, developed by EUROPEUM and major input from EuPI/OSI-Sofia. The seven policy areas under research are:

- I. Internal market/Lisbon Strategy;
- II. Minority integration and citizenship issues;
- III. Energy and climate change;
- IV. Budget review and CAP Health Check;
- V. EU foreign policy and enlargement;
- VI. Freedom, Security and Justice;
- VII. Institutional issues.

The research was carried out primarily in the period September 2008 – December 2009, but there may be references beyond this period. Some positions and circumstances described in the reports may have changed since the information was last made available to the researchers or reached the stage of publication.

The researchers' findings are published in ten country reports on each of the New Member States: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The structure of the country reports includes an overview of the country's performance as an EU member and seven chapters following the seven broad policy areas. Each chapter contains an overview of the position of this country in the area, including the top three national priorities. Then the chapters provide in-depth analyses, information and prognoses on a set of issues (defined as general and specific) within each of the seven policy areas.

The comparative policy report is based mainly on in-depth country reports from the ten New Member States, but the responsibility for the analysis, the expressed views and conclusions lies with the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Open Society Institute – Sofia.

### Classifications: Policy Taker, Killer, and Driver explained

In the classification of this study, Policy Takers are those states that usually follow the mainstream in the EU and in general accept whatever is offered from the EU. The reasons may vary — from the lack of stakes and interests in the issue, to the lack of capacity to formulate a meaningful position, or they may have a position but lack the weight and experience to promote it.

The Policy Driver is a country that assertively promotes an issue at EU level. Ideally, a Policy Driver would have a broad political consensus and public support at home, capacity and expertise to advocate successfully, and carry the weight to gather coalitions and promote the policy. This may also imply additional legitimacy, measured also by the added value of this policy to the "European project" or adherence to the "European values" or "common European interest".

A Policy Killer is exactly the same as a Policy Driver, but with an opposite sign. In many cases, a Policy Killer country becomes a Driver if it succeeds in proposing a feasible and viable alternative to the policy it tried to prevent.

While all members are at some point "Policy Drivers" or "Killers", the crown of a "super Policy Driver" and "super Policy Killer" goes undoubtedly to Poland. Poland, the biggest of the new members, with enough self-confidence, has led an effective opposition to the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, and to the energy and climate package.

The researchers were also asked to provide a forecast for the short and medium-term positions and behaviour of the country, based on diverse factors triggering change — domestic political change, rise of powerful stakeholders able to promote or kill a policy,

a window of opportunity to intervene, reversal of policy at EU level that causes negative reaction, etc.

### **Detailed list of issues for examination**

#### **I. Internal market and Lisbon Strategy**

(Growth and jobs in EC work plan and policy strategy)

1. Overview
2. General issues:
  - 2.1 Review of merger regulations
  - 2.2 Free movement of workers across the EU and transitional periods
  - 2.3 Positions on the Strategic Review of the "Better Regulation" package (COM(2006) 689) and ECOFIN Conclusions, 22 January 2008; EC Simplification Rolling Programme after screening the acquis
  - 2.4 General views of the free movement of services as enshrined in the current Services Directive
  - 2.5 Positions on taxation harmonisation
3. Specific issues:
  - 3.1. Free Small Business Act (SBA) (COM(2007) 592)
  - 3.2. Financial retail services (SEC(2007) 1520)

#### **II. Minority integration and citizenship issues**

1. Overview
2. General Issues:
  - 2.1. The emerging European Roma Strategy
  - 2.2. Other minorities' integration issues
3. Specific issues:
  - 3.1. Formulation of action plans to improve housing conditions, create possibilities for employment and guarantee affordable health care and education for Roma;
  - 3.2. Institutionalisation of European policy on Roma by establishment of a Roma Unit within the EC;
  - 3.3. Position and policies related to Commission Communication COM(2008) 420 final from 2 July 2008 on Non-discrimination and Equal Opportunities: A Renewed Commitment and also Community Instruments and Policies for Roma Inclusion, Staff working document accompanying Commission Communication COM(2008) 420.

#### **III. Energy and climate**

1. Overview
2. General issues:
  - 2.1. Strategic energy review (2007) and positions towards 2010-2014 energy action plan
  - 2.2. The post-Kyoto/post-2012 proposals — the global dimension
  - 2.3. Commitment to meet the benchmarks for greenhouse emissions
  - 2.4. Strategy and commitment to increase the share of renewable sources
  - 2.5. Strategy towards nuclear energy
  - 2.6. Implementation of the revised Emission Trading Scheme
  - 2.7. External dimension of energy security
3. Specific issues:
  - 3.1. Liberalisation of the energy market — 3<sup>rd</sup> energy package (unbundling)
  - 3.2. Common rules for the internal market in electricity (COM(2007) 508), cross border exchanges in electricity (COM(2007) 531), common rules for the internal market in gas (COM(2007) 529), access conditions to the gas transition network
  - 3.3. Establishment of the Agency for Co-operation of Energy Regulators (COM(2007) 503)

#### **IV. Budget review and CAP "Health Check"**

1. Overview
2. General issues:
  - 2.1. Position towards CAP "Health Check" (COM(2007)722)
  - 2.2. Positions towards the expenditure structure of post-2013 budget (SEC (2007) 1188)
  - 2.3. Position towards Common Market Organisation for Fisheries

#### **V. EU foreign policy and enlargement**

1. Overview
2. General issues:
  - 2.1. Preference of countries for accession and any specific points or concerns relating to it (including bilateral disputes and how they might translate into EU-level policy and decision making)
  - 2.2. Preference for any particular country in the framework of ENP

- 2.3. Enhanced ESDP, increasing Europe's defence capabilities etc.
- 2.4. Position towards Kosovo, e.g. status and EU mission in Kosovo
- 2.5. Transatlantic relations
- 3. Specific issues:
  - 3.1. Completion of accession negotiations with Croatia
  - 3.2. Opening of accession negotiations with Macedonia
  - 3.3. Signing of SAA with Serbia
  - 3.4. Blockage of accession talks with Turkey, possibility of unblocking it
  - 3.5. Polish-Swedish initiative for ENP Eastern Partnership
  - 3.6. Strategy for the Black Sea Region/Black Sea Synergy Implementation assessment
  - 3.7. Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
  - 3.8. Revision of European Security Strategy

## **VI. Freedom, Security and Justice**

- 1. Overview
- 2. General issues:
  - 2.1. Common European asylum system
  - 2.2. Common European migration policy
  - 2.3. Enhanced role in co-operation of law enforcement agencies and their co-operation at EU level
  - 2.4. Harmonisation of serious aspects of cross-border crimes
- 3. Specific issues:
  - 3.1. Establishment of Eurosur (European border surveillance system)
  - 3.2. Establishment of entry-exit system and other border management tools
  - 3.3. Amendments of asylum-related regulations (2003/9/EC – reception conditions for asylum seekers, regulation 343/2003 on the determination of Member States responsible for assessing asylum applications)
  - 3.4. Evaluation of FRONTEX and the future developments in this area

## **VII. Institutional issues**

- 1. Overview
- 2. General issues:
  - 2.1. Representation of the country in the EU institutions: EC, European council, EP – a backgrounder
  - 2.2. Position of the country and the different stakeholders (including public opinion) towards the Lisbon Treaty and the framework of changes introduced by it
  - 2.3. Alternative proposals to the institutional development of the EU, rated by the relative influence of their proponents (e.g. multi-speed Europe, one-voice foreign policy, etc.)
- 3. Specific issues:
  - 3.1. Position towards the main changes offered by the Lisbon Treaty:
    - Extended qualified majority voting;
    - European Parliament's increased role;
    - President of the European Council;
    - High Representative for Foreign Policy;
    - Revision of the representation in the European Commission;
    - Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding
  - 3.2. Implementation of institutional innovations:
    - President of the European Council: competences vis-à-vis the rotating presidency, job description, secretariat and its size etc.
    - EU High Representative: competences vis-à-vis the two presidents, relation to other commissioners with external relations portfolios, competences and relations vis-à-vis the rotating presidency
    - EU External Action Service: Implementation of the EU External Action Service:
  - 3.3. Future of Lisbon Treaty ratification

<b>Country abbreviations</b>	
EU27 European Union - 27 Member States	
BE	Belgium
CZ	Czech Republic
BG	Bulgaria
DK	Denmark
<i>D-E</i>	<i>East Germany</i>
DE	Germany
<i>D-W</i>	<i>West Germany</i>
EE	Estonia
EL	Greece
ES	Spain
FR	France
IE	Ireland
IT	Italy
CY	Republic of Cyprus *
CY (tcc)	Zone not controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus
LT	Lithuania
LV	Latvia
LU	Luxembourg
HU	Hungary
MT	Malta
NL	Netherlands
AT	Austria
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
RO	Romania
SI	Slovenia
SK	Slovakia
FI	Finland
SE	Sweden
UK	United Kingdom
HR	Croatia
TR	Turkey
MK	Republic of Macedonia



**Table of national positions of the new member states on key issues of the EU agenda and an outlook for the short and mid-term**  
**An experiment with classification and forecasting**

**Disclaimer: please read before proceeding**

In the course of the current study, the country researchers were asked to classify the position and policy behaviour of the country as Policy Taker, Policy Driver or Policy Killer on the respective issues. The judgments had to be based on the level and character of activity, interest and involvement of the country in the given policy area. The researchers were also asked to provide a forecast for the short and medium-term positions and behaviour of the country, based on diverse factors triggering change — domestic political change, rise of powerful stakeholders able to promote or kill a policy, a window of opportunity to intervene, reversal of policy at EU level that causes negative reaction, etc.

The information in the tables below (based on the information provided in the country reports) should be used with caution, as the positions and factors at play are nuanced, multifaceted and complex: simplified tick-boxes of classification, presented in the tables below, can never be too accurate. From the very beginning, this was intended more for **orientation purposes and the provided substantive reports should be consulted** for a detailed analytical description, as the authors themselves diligently point to several possible explanations and scenarios for future development. For example, the tables may present countries such as Slovenia and the Czech Republic much more “policy drivers” than, let’s say Poland, which is the undisputed “super policy driver” as shown in the comparative report. But on the other hand, the explanation may be that the Czech Republic or Slovenia received their “drivers” status as a result of holding recently the rotating presidencies of the EU. This actually supports the case that the rotating presidency status gives an opportunity and experience of even smaller member states to promote the agenda.

Nevertheless, this is a valuable set of information, based on good expert knowledge and judgment. Further work in this direction would certainly have introduced many improvements, but the time necessary for doing this would have made it politically irrelevant by the time it is published. Therefore, it was decided to include rather than omit this information in the report and leave it to the readers’ own discretion what use they can make out of it.

This table contains the distribution of the number of different replies (i.e. policy taker, driver, killer) provided on a given characteristic (i.e. policy issues in our case) by the country experts – hence the numbers in the rows below and the percentages in the last columns.

The legend is: Policy Taker – **T**; Policy Driver – **D**; Policy Killer – **K**. In case there is one more option for the “position”, they are noted with small letters: “t” for taker, “d” for driver, “k” for killer. In case no position is provided, it is notes with a blank box.

Current positions of the new member states													Outlook: positions of the new members in the short and mid-term												
	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Slovenia	Total	Total %		Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Slovenia	Total	Total %
<b>Internal Market and Lisbon Strategy</b>	BG	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	PL	RO	SK	SI			<b>Internal Market and Lisbon Strategy</b>	BG	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	PL	RO	SK	SI		
Review of merger regulations	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Review of merger regulations	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T		
Free movement of workers	T	D	T	D	D	T	D	D	D	T			Free movement of workers	D	D	T	D	K	T	D	D	D	T		
“Better Regulation”	T	D	T	-	T	T	T	T	T	D			“Better Regulation”	T	D	T	-	T	T	T	T	T	T		
Free movement of services	T	D	T	D	D	T	D	T	D	T			Free movement of services	T	D	T	D	D	D	D	D	T	T		
Taxation harmonization	K	K	K	D	K	T	T	K	K	K			Taxation harmonization	K	K	K	D	K	K	K	K	K	K		
Small Business Act	T	D	T	T	T	T	D	T	T	T			Small Business Act	T	D	T	T	T	T	D	T	T	T		
Financial retail services	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Financial retail services	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T		
Total/Total %	T	D	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	68	100%	Total/Total %	T	D	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	68	100%
Policy Taker (T)	6	2	6	3	4	7	4	5	3	5	45	66%	Policy Taker (T)	6	3	6	3	4	7	4	5	4	4	46	68%
Policy Driver (D)	0	4	0	3	2	0	3	1	2	1	16	24%	Policy Driver (D)	0	4	0	3	2	0	3	1	1	1	15	22%
Policy Killer (K)	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	7	10%	Policy Killer (K)	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	7	10%
<b>Minority integration and citizenship issues</b>	BG	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	PL	RO	SK	SI			<b>Minority integration and citizenship issues</b>	BG	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	PL	RO	SK	SI		
The emerging European Roma Strategy	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	D	T	T			The emerging European Roma Strategy	K	T	T	D	T	T	T	D	T	T		
Other minorities’ integration issues	T	-	T	D	-	T	T	T	T	T			Other minorities’ integration issues	T	-	D	D	-	T	T	K	T	T		
Formulation of action plans	D	T	T	T	T	T	T	D	T	T			Formulation of action plans	D	T	T	T	T	T	T	D	T	T		
Institutionalization of European policy on Roma	T	-	T	D	T	T	T	D	T	T			Institutionalization of European policy on Roma	T	-	T	D	T	T	T	D	T	T		
Non-discrimination and equal opportunities	T	K/t	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Non-discrimination and equal opportunities	T	K	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T		


Total/Total %	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	D	T	T	47	100%	Total/Total %	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	D	T	T	47	100%
Policy Taker (T)	4	2	5	2	4	5	5	2	5	5	39	83%	Policy Taker (T)	5	2	4	2	4	5	5	1	5	5	38	81%
Policy Driver (D)	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	7	15%	Policy Driver (D)	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	7	15%
Policy Killer (K)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2%	Policy Killer (K)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	4%
<b>Energy/climate change</b>	<b>BG</b>	<b>CZ</b>	<b>EE</b>	<b>HU</b>	<b>LV</b>	<b>LT</b>	<b>PL</b>	<b>RO</b>	<b>SK</b>	<b>SI</b>			<b>Energy/climate change</b>	<b>BG</b>	<b>CZ</b>	<b>EE</b>	<b>HU</b>	<b>LV</b>	<b>LT</b>	<b>PL</b>	<b>RO</b>	<b>SK</b>	<b>SI</b>		
Strategic energy review/energy action plan	T	D	T	T	D	T	T	D	T	T			Strategic energy review/energy action plan	D	D	T	T	D	D	T	D	T	T		
The post-Kyoto/post-2012 proposals	D	T	T	T	D	T	D	D	T	D			The post-Kyoto/post-2012 proposals	D	D	T	T	D	K	D	K	T	D		
Benchmarks for greenhouse emissions	T	T	T	T	D/k	T	K/t	K	T	T			Benchmarks for greenhouse emissions	D	T	T	T	K	T	T	K	T	T		
Share of renewable sources	K	K	T	T	D	T	D	T	D	T			Share of renewable sources	D	K	D	T	D	T	T	T	T	T		
Strategy towards nuclear energy	D	D	T	T	T	T	T	T	D	D			Strategy towards nuclear energy	D	D	T	D	T	T	T	D	D	D		
Revised Emissions Trading Scheme	D	K	T	T	D	T	D	T	D	T			Revised Emissions Trading Scheme	D	D	T	T	D	K	D	T	D	T		
External dimension of energy security	K	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	K			External dimension of energy security	K	D	T	D	D	D	D	D	D	T		
3rd energy package (unbundling)	K	T	K	T	D	T	T	T	K/d	D			3rd energy package (unbundling)	D	T	K	T	D	D	T	T	T	T		
Common rules for the internal market	T	D	D	T	D	T	T	T	K/d	T			Common rules for the internal market	K	D	K	T	D	D	T	T	T	T		
Agency for Co-operation of Energy Regulators	T	D	T	D	T	T	T	T	K/t	T			Agency for Co-operation of Energy Regulators	T	D	T	D	T	D	T	T	D/t	T		
Total/Total %	T	D	T	T	D	T	T	T	D	T	101	100%	Total/Total %	D	D	T	T	D	D	T	T	D	T	100	100%
Policy Taker (T)	4	3	7	8	2	9	5	6	3	6	53	52%	Policy Taker (T)	1	2	7	7	2	3	7	5	6	6	46	46%
Policy Driver (D)	3	5	2	2	9	1	4	3	4	3	36	36%	Policy Driver (D)	7	7	1	3	7	5	3	3	4	4	44	44%
Policy Killer (K)	3	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	1	12	12%	Policy Killer (K)	2	1	2	0	1	2	0	2	0	0	10	10%
<b>Budget review and CAP health check</b>	<b>BG</b>	<b>CZ</b>	<b>EE</b>	<b>HU</b>	<b>LV</b>	<b>LT</b>	<b>PL</b>	<b>RO</b>	<b>SK</b>	<b>SI</b>			<b>Budget review and CAP health check</b>	<b>BG</b>	<b>CZ</b>	<b>EE</b>	<b>HU</b>	<b>LV</b>	<b>LT</b>	<b>PL</b>	<b>RO</b>	<b>SK</b>	<b>SI</b>		

CAP "Health Check"	D	D/t	T	T	D	T	T	T	K	T			CAP "Health Check"	D	K	T	T	K	T	K	T	K	T		
Common Market Organization for Fisheries	T	T	T	-	D	T	T	T	T	T			Common Market Organization for Fisheries	T	T	T	-	D	T	D	T	T	T		
Expenditure structure of post-2013 budget	T	D	T	T	D	T	D	T	D	T			Expenditure structure of post-2013 budget	D	K	D	T	D	D	D	T	D	T		
Total/Total %	T	D	T	T	D	T	T	T	=	T	29	100%	Total/Total %	D	K	T	T	D	T	D	T	=	T	29	100%
Policy Taker (T)	2	1	3	2	0	3	2	3	1	0	17	59%	Policy Taker (T)	1	1	2	2	0	2	1	3	1	0	13	45%
Policy Driver (D)	1	2	0	0	3	0	1	0	1	3	11	38%	Policy Driver (D)	2	0	1	0	2	1	2	0	1	3	12	41%
Policy Killer (K)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	3%	Policy Killer (K)	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	4	14%
<b>EU foreign policy and enlargement</b>	<b>BG</b>	<b>CZ</b>	<b>EE</b>	<b>HU</b>	<b>LV</b>	<b>LT</b>	<b>PL</b>	<b>RO</b>	<b>SK</b>	<b>SI</b>			<b>EU foreign policy and enlargement</b>	<b>BG</b>	<b>CZ</b>	<b>EE</b>	<b>HU</b>	<b>LV</b>	<b>LT</b>	<b>PL</b>	<b>RO</b>	<b>SK</b>	<b>SI</b>		
Preference for accession countries	T/d	D	T/d	T	D	T	D	T	D	D			Preference for accession countries	T/d	D	T/d	T	D	D	D	T	D	D		
Preference for a ENP country	T	D	T	T	D	T	D	D	D	T			Preference for a ENP country	D	D	D	T	D	D	D	D	D	T		
Enhanced ESDP	T	T	T	T	T	T	D	T	T	T			Enhanced ESDP	T	T	T	T	K	D	D	T	T	T		
Position towards Kosovo	D	T	D	T	D	T	T	K/t	K/d	D			Position towards Kosovo	T	T	D	T	D	T	T	K/t	K/d	D		
Transatlantic relations	T	D/t	D	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Transatlantic relations	T	D/t	D	T	T	D	T	T	T	T		
Accession negotiations with Croatia	T	D	T	D	D	T	T	T	D	T			Accession negotiations with Croatia	T	D	D	D	D	D	T	T	D	T		
Opening of negotiations with Macedonia	T	D	T	T	T	T	T	K	T	D			Opening of negotiations with Macedonia	T	D	D	T	T	T	T	K	D/t	D		
Signing of SAA with Serbia	T	D	T	D	T	T	T	D	D	D			Signing of SAA with Serbia	T	D	T	D	T	D	T	D	D	D		
Accession talks with Turkey	T	T	D	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Accession talks with Turkey	T/k	D	D	T	T	T	K	T	T	T		
Eastern Partnership	T	D	T	D	D	T	D	D	T	T			Eastern Partnership	T	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	T		
Strategy for the Black Sea Region	D	T	T	T	T	T	K	D	T	T			Strategy for the Black Sea Region	D	T	T	T	T	T	T	D	T	T		
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region	T	T	T	T	D	T	D	T	T	T			Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region	T	T	D	T	D	T	D	T	T	T		
Revision of European Security Strategy	T	T	T	T	T	T	D	T	T	T			Revision of European Security Strategy	T	T	T	T	K	D	D	T	T	T		
Total/Total %	T	D	T	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	130	100%	Total/Total %	T	D	D	T	T	D	D	T	D	T	130	100%
Policy Taker (T)	11	6	10	10	7	13	6	7	8	9	87	67%	Policy Taker (T)	11	5	5	10	5	5	6	7	6	9	69	53%
Policy Driver (D)	2	7	3	3	6	0	6	4	4	4	39	30%	Policy Driver (D)	2	8	8	3	6	8	6	4	6	4	55	42%


Policy Killer (K) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0												4	3%	Policy Killer (K) 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 0												6	5%
Freedom, Security and Justice												Freedom, Security and Justice															
	BG	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	PL	RO	SK	SI				BG	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	PL	RO	SK	SI				
Common European asylum policy	T	K/t	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Common European asylum policy	T	K/t	K	T	T	K	T	T	T	T				
Common European migration policy	T	K/t	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Common European migration policy	T	K/t	T	T	K	K	D/t	T	T	T				
Law enforcement agencies	T	K/t	T	T	T	T	T	T	D	D			Law enforcement agencies	T	K/t	T	T	T	T	D	T	D	D				
Serious aspects of cross-border crimes	T	K/t	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Serious aspects of cross-border crimes	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T				
Establishment of Eurosur	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Establishment of Eurosur	T	T	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	D				
Entry – exit system	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Entry – exit system	T	K	T	T	T	D	K	T	T	T				
Amendments of asylum – related regulations	T	K	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Amendments of asylum regulations	T	K	T	T	T	K	T	T	T	D				
Evaluation of FRONTEX	T	K	T	D	T	T	T	T	D	D			Evaluation of FRONTEX	T	K	T	D	T	D	T	T	D	D				
Total/Total %	T	K	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	80	100%	Total/Total %	T	K	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	D	82	100%		
Policy Taker (T)	8	2	8	7	8	8	8	8	6	6	69	86%	Policy Taker (T)	8	2	7	7	7	3	4	8	6	4	56	68%		
Policy Driver (D)	0	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	11	14%	Policy Driver (D)	0	0	0	0	0	3	5	0	2	4	14	17%		
Policy Killer (K)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	Policy Killer (K)	0	6	1	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	12	15%		
Institutional issues												Institutional issues															
Positions towards the Lisbon Treaty	T	K/d	T	T	T	T	D	T	D	T			Positions towards the Lisbon Treaty	T	K	T	T	T	T	D	T	D	T				
Alternatives to EU development	K	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	K	T			Alternatives to EU development	K	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	K	K				
Extended qualified majority voting	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Extended qualified majority voting	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T				
European Parliament increased role	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			European Parliament increased role	T	T	T	T	T	T	D	T	T	T				
President of the European Council	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			President of the European Council	T	T	K	T	T	T	D	T	T	T				
High Representative for Foreign Policy	T	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	T	T			High Representative for Foreign Policy	T	T	T	T	D	T	D	T	T	T				

Revision of the European Commission	T	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	D	T			Revision of the European Commission	T	T	T	T	D	T	D	K	K	T		
Charter of Human Right legally binding	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Charter of Human Right legally binding	T	T	T	T	T	T	K	T	T	T		
Competences of President of the European Council	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Competences of President of the European Council	K	T	K	T	T	D	D	T	T	T		
Comptetences of the EU High representative	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T			Comptetences of the EU High representative	D	T	T	T	D	D	D	T	T	T		
EU External Action Service	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	D	T			EU External Action Service	D	T	T	T	D	D	D	T	D	T		
Future of Lisbon Treaty ratification	T	K/d	T	T	T	T	D	T	D	T			Future of Lisbon Treaty ratification	T	T	T	T	T	D	D	T	D	T		
Total/Total %	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	120	100%	Total/Total %	T	T	T	T	T	T	D	T	T	T	120	100%
Policy Taker (T)	11	10	12	12	9	12	10	12	7	12	107	89%	Policy Taker (T)	10	10	10	12	7	8	9	11	7	11	95	79%
Policy Driver (D)	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	4	0	9	8%	Policy Driver (D)	0	1	0	0	5	4	2	0	3	0	15	13%
Policy Killer (K)	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	3%	Policy Killer (K)	2	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	10	8%

**A histogram of distribution of expert replies by policy area: current state**



**A histogram of distribution of expert replies by policy area: an outlook**





**This EuPI project has been implemented in close partnership with EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, with funding provided by the Open Society Institute – Sofia.**



### **About EuPI**

The European Policy Initiative (EuPI) of the Open Society Institute – Sofia aims at stimulating and assisting the New Member States from CEE to develop capacity for constructive co-authorship of common European policies at both government and civil society level. As a new priority area of the European Policies and Civic Participation Program of Open Society Institute – Sofia, EuPI will contribute to improving the capacity of New Member States to effectively impact common European policies through quality research, policy recommendations, networking and advocacy. The initiative operates in the ten New Member States from CEE through a network of experts and policy institutes.

### **Address:**

Open Society Institute – Sofia  
European Policies Initiative (EuPI)  
56 Solunska Str.  
Sofia 1000  
Tel.: (+359 2) 930 66 19  
Fax: (+359 2) 951 63 48  
E-mail: [eupi@osi.bg](mailto:eupi@osi.bg)  
Web EuPI: [www.eupi.eu](http://www.eupi.eu)  
Web OSI-Sofia: [www.osi.bg](http://www.osi.bg)

### **About EUROPEUM**

EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy is a non-profit, non-partisan and independent institute. It focuses on the issues of European integration and its impact on the transformation of political, economic and legal milieu in the Czech Republic. EUROPEUM strives to contribute to a long-lasting development of democracy, security, stability, freedom and solidarity across Europe. EUROPEUM formulates opinions and offers alternatives to internal reforms in the Czech Republic with a view of ensuring her full-fledged membership and respected position in the European Union.

### **Address:**

EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy  
Rytířská 31  
Praha 1, 110 00  
Czech Republic  
Tel.: (+420) 221.610.206-7  
Fax: (+420) 221.610.204  
Web: [www.europeum.org](http://www.europeum.org)

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